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Abstract. This paper examines changes in individual real incomes in South Africa between 1995
and 2000. We document substantial declines—on the order of 40%—in real incomes for both men
and women. The brunt of the income decline appears to have been shouldered by the young and the
non-White. We argue that changes in respondent attributes are insuﬃcient to explain this decline.
For most groups, a (conservative) correction for selection into income recipiency explains some,
but not all, of the income decline. For other groups, selection is a potential explanation for the
income decline. Perhaps the most persuasive explanation of the evidence is substantial economic
restructuring of the South African economy in which wages are not bid up to keep pace with price
changes due to a diﬀerentially slack labor market.
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1. Introduction and Overview
This paper is about trying to understand how and why the distribution of individual incomes in
South Africa has changed since the fall of apartheid. The topic is timely as South Africa recently
celebrated the ten year anniversary of democracy in that country. While South Africans clearly
have much more political freedom than they did under apartheid, the improvements in economic
well-being are less apparent. We employ detailed income and expenditure data from 1995 and from
2000 to examine the latter.
In the normal course of events, one would not expect to see signiﬁcant changes in the overall
distribution of income over only a ﬁve year span.1 The ﬁve years following the advent of democracy,
though, are not representative of the normal course of events. Even an abbreviated list of changes
during this period would include South Africa’s re-engagement with the international economy,
continued attempts to integrate the apartheid-deﬁned homelands with the new national economy,
the possible emigration of highly skilled Whites, and an HIV infection rate that was probably
among the highest in the world. All of the above changes have labor market implications. This
list, though, is exclusive of government programs focused speciﬁcally on the labor market. There
were in fact several such programs.
The ruling party in South Africa during this period (and still today) was the African National
Congress (ANC). Elected on April 27, 1994, the ANC proceeded to introduce several labor market
policies with a focus on redistribution. In 1995 the new Labour Relations Act was passed. This law
We are grateful to John DiNardo for countless hours of discussion—some of it even on-topic. Thanks to
Jere Behrman, Chico Ferreira, David Lam, Doug Miller, and Berk Ozler for helpful comments. Matthew Welch of
DataFirst at the University of Cape Town and Justin Thomas have provided almost six years of invaluable assistance
with the data sets. Vimal Ranchhod provided exemplary research assistance. Leibbrandt and Levinsohn gratefully
acknowledge research support from the National Institutes of Health.
1 Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig (2001), in their review of income distribution dynamics, recommend at least
a ten year interval.
1defended the right of workers to unionize and provided a framework for employer-employee dispute
resolution. In 1997, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act was passed. This law provided the
right to annual leave and imposed rules and procedures to prevent unfair dismissal. In 1998, the
Skills Development Act and the Employment Equity Act were passed. The former provided an
institutional framework for improving workforce skills while the latter was the centerpiece of the
ANC’s aﬃrmative action strategy. The Employment Equity Act required all ﬁrms of a certain size
and turnover to comply with various aﬃrmative action requirements. These included an increase in
the proportion of non-Whites and females at all levels. Firms also had to submit a strategic plan,
with numerical targets, for increasing the diversity of their workforce. Finally, in 1999, the Skills
Development Levies Act was passed and this eﬀectively introduced a payroll tax on employees to
help fund the “Skills Development Fund.”
Clearly, the labor market was in transition. Pro-labor groups tended to hail these changes as
a great and long-past-due success while business often saw the changes as making a bad situation
worse. Business groups wondered how taxing labor and increasing union strength would help
increase employment. The ANC’s labor market policies were concurrent with a macroeconomic
policy (coined GEAR– Growth, Employment, and Redistribution) that placed a strong emphasis
on macroeconomic stability and export-led growth. The strategy (mostly realized) was to use ﬁscal
conservatism, reduced state debt, and increased openness to the global market to achieve (mostly
unrealized) growth.
There were also changes in non-labor market incomes. Prior to around 1992, government old-age
pensions were eﬀectively race-based (see Case and Deaton (1998)). By 1995, the ﬁrst year of our
data, government old-age pensions were available to all on a more or less race-blind basis. Hence,
changes in the real income provided by these pensions impacted large segments of the population.
Accordingly, we investigate the possible role of changes in non-labor market incomes in determining
the distribution of overall incomes.
We begin our analysis by simply documenting the changes in individual incomes in South Africa
from 1995 to 2000. We are, we believe, the ﬁrst to do so. Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004) examine
changes in household income and expenditure, while Lam and Leibbrandt (2004) examine changes
in household income and individual labor market earnings with a focus on documenting changes in
inequality.
We ﬁnd that the entire distribution of individual log real incomes shifted substantially to the
left from 1995 to 2000. This is true for both men and women, and it is true for both labor and (to a
lesser extent) pension income. Simply put, individual incomes seem to have fallen in post-apartheid
2South Africa. The more interesting question, and one at which we attempt a ﬁrst pass, is “Why?”2
Our analysis does not, in the end, deliver a deﬁnitive answer to this provocative question. One
explanation that is consistent with the data is a mix of skill-biased technical change, increases in
the supply of labor that have outstripped increases in the demand for labor, and growing disparities
in the quality of education. There may be other explanations that are also consistent with the data.
We show, though, that several potential explanations simply are not consistent with the data. A
contribution of this paper is that it presents basic facts with which any explanation for the decline
must grapple.
Individual incomes, conditional on being positive, are a function of the individual’s endowments
(which could include household-level attributes) and returns on those endowments. There are, then,
three possible explanations for the change in the distribution of log income. First, endowments
might have changed. This could occur either because those with positive incomes are diﬀerent in
the two time periods (this is often termed “selection on observables”), or because endowments are
actually changing over time (e.g., human capital). Second, returns to those endowments might have
changed. Third and perhaps less obviously, selection into the class of individuals reporting positive
income might have changed in ways unrelated to endowments (“selection on unobservables”). We
refer to these respectively as the endowments explanation, the returns explanation, and the selection
explanation. They are of course not mutually exclusive and, in principle, all could be important.
Our approach to investigating these explanations is, for the most part, nonparametric. To inves-
tigate the endowments explanation, we follow the methodology developed by DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (1996), hereinafter DFL. This methodology allows one to investigate the role of changes
in the entire vector of endowments as well as the impact of individual components comprising the
vector of endowments. We ﬁnd that while endowments in South Africa experienced some minor
changes during our study period, the changes are not suﬃcient to explain the decline in income.
To investigate the returns explanation, we show how the basic idea behind DFL can be applied
to investigate changes in returns (as opposed to endowments). This allows us to nonparametrically
investigate the extent to which changes in the entire vector of returns can explain the shift in the
distributions of income.3 However, this technique does not allow one to answer how a shift in
the return to only one endowment aﬀected the income distribution, holding constant the return to
2 We are sensitive to the Holland (1986) critique of such questions. We stress that the key aim of the present
paper is description.
3 We also develop a second extension of the DFL procedure which we argue provides useful context for interpre-
tation of the endowments counterfactual, as proposed in DFL. See section 4, below.
3other endowments. The problem does not lie with the methodology, but rather with the model-
speciﬁc nature of the concept of a return. Consequently, we also consider changes in individual
returns in the context of a group-speciﬁc linear regression model. Our primary conclusion from
the non-parametric approach is that changes in returns can in fact explain a substantial portion of
the shift in the distribution of incomes. The more parametric investigation further suggests that
young South Africans and Black South Africans have borne the brunt of the recent declines in real
income. However, the return to a year of education, as conventionally measured, experienced very
little change from 1995 to 2000.
To investigate the selection explanation, we ﬁrst examine group-speciﬁc income changes and
compare these magnitudes to patterns in labor market entry and exit. These results indicate that
if selection is responsible for some of the estimated income decline, then it is selection of a relatively
complex variety. For example, women systematically entered, and men systematically exited, the
labor market between 1995 and 2000, and yet both genders experienced real income declines of
approximately 40%. We also implement the bounding procedure outlined in Lee (2004),4 but, to
our knowledge, never before actually implemented. For some groups we consider, the results are
consistent with a role for selection in explaining the erosion of real incomes; however, for most
population groups, even this conservative approach cannot fully explain the recent income declines.
While the focus of this paper is on what happened to incomes in South Africa, the general
approach we take may be of interest to a broader literature. Investigating two of the possible
explanations (the returns explanation and the selection explanation) required developing and/or
implementing new tools to nonparametrically evaluate why distributions of an outcome variable (in
this case log income) have shifted. These methodological innovations are applicable to a wide range
of problems in economics as heterogeneity in micro-level outcomes is the topic of several ﬁelds of
economics (e.g., incomes for individuals, productivity for plants, expenditure for households, and
exports for ﬁrms).
In broad strokes, our analysis supports the view that an individual sampled at random in
South Africa was (economically) better oﬀ in 1995 than in 2000. We interpret that contrast to
be the relevant one for evaluating social welfare, abstracting, of course, from improvements in
political freedoms and “psychic income” generally. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 sets the stage by describing the patterns in the
data that motivate both the questions asked and the methodologies employed. Section 4 describes
4 Lee’s approach is based on Heckman (1976) and Gronau (1974) and leans heavily on the one-sided selection
model.
4our nonparametric approaches to investigating the endowments, the returns, and the selection
explanations. Methodology as well as results are presented in each of three sub-sections—one for
each explanation. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. The Data
Before presenting even descriptive analyses that motivate our nonparametric approach, it is neces-
sary to introduce and describe the data.
We employ ﬁve data sets. For 1995, we use the October Household Survey (OHS) and the
Income and Expenditure Survey (IES). For 2000, we use the September Labour Force Survey and
the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey. In order to make real comparisons, we employ a data
set of price deﬂators provided by Statistics South Africa.
The 1995 OHS is a general purpose, nationally representative household survey conducted by
Statistics South Africa. The OHS is an annual survey that ran from 1994 to 1999. Although the
survey instrument is very consistent from year to year, the OHS is not a panel. In 1995, the OHS
obtained responses for almost 131,000 individuals comprising about 30,000 households. The OHS is
excellent for some purposes and less ideal for others. It has excellent socio-demographic information
but the income data in the OHS are notoriously poor. Fortunately for our purposes, the sample
for the 1995 OHS was also the sample for the 1995 IES.
The 1995 IES was collected (also by Statistics South Africa) in December, 1995. Of the 29,700
households in the OHS, the IES included 29,582. These households were comprised of almost
129,000 individuals. Not surprisingly, the income information in the IES is very detailed and quite
complete.5 Although the same individuals were in principle included in the OHS and IES, there
is entry and exit from some households over the span of October to December. We only include
individuals who were present in both the IES and OHS.6 The careful matched merge of the IES
and OHS results in a sample size of over 113,000 individuals from almost 28,000 households.
In 2000, the OHS was replaced by the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is conducted twice
a year and we use the September survey since it is temporally closest to the IES. Perhaps because
the LFS is the successor to the OHS, many of the key questions are asked the same way in each
5 One explanation oﬀered for the poor income data in the 1995 OHS is that Statistics South Africa knew they
would be re-interviewing the same households a couple months later and so did not put a lot of time into getting
complete responses to the income questions in October.
6 In practice this means excluding individuals who age more than a year from October to December, whose reported
gender or race changes, or who simply are not present in either the OHS or IES. We also are forced to exclude twins
since it is not possible to identify which person is which when merging the IES and OHS.
5of the surveys. This facilitates 1995-2000 comparisons. In the September 2000 LFS, there were
about 105,000 individuals comprising about 26,600 households. The 2000 IES surveyed the same
individuals. The format of the IES survey was the same in 2000 as in 1995 and questions were asked
in identical ways. While we are sensitive to issues that arise in terms of how income information
is gathered, the 1995 and 2000 Income and Expenditure Surveys are about as compatible as they
could be.7;8 After merging the 2000 IES and LFS, again being careful to delete individuals that
do not match key demographics, we are left with just over 101,000 individuals comprising almost
26,000 households.9
When we then limit our analyses to individuals age 18 and older with valid information on
age, race, gender, education, and sampling weight, we are left with 69,701 individuals in 1995 and
60,415 in 2000.10 Appendix Table 3 lists the number of individuals in our sample in each year by
age, race, and gender.
Making real comparisons requires adjusting for inﬂation. To do so, we employ CPI deﬂators
provided by Statistics South Africa. The South African CPI data are available at the provincial
level. Cross-province variation in price levels, though, is negligible, possibly reﬂecting the good
infrastructure of South Africa relative to many of its African neighbors. The price data do not
include prices from rural locations. In some countries, this would be a signiﬁcant omission, but
we do not believe this is the case in South Africa. Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004) report that their
poverty and inequality analyses are unaﬀected by assuming that prices in rural areas are ﬁve percent
higher. They also note that in the 2000 IES, approximately 60 percent of rural households report
purchasing grain products in nearby urban areas. They also report that rural households bought
most of their non-food items in urban areas. Finally, note that it is changes in the urban/rural
relative price gap that will impact our analysis. There is little reason to believe these are signiﬁcant.
In the results reported, we use a single price deﬂater for the entire country.
7 We elected not to use the 1993 LSMS survey for just this reason. The income questions in 1993 are not exactly
compatible with those in the 2000 IES.
8 Perhaps the only aspect of non-comparability in the data is the commonly-encountered diﬃculty of distinguishing
zero values for income from missing values for income. For 1995, there are no missing values for total income. For
2000, just below 3% of individuals aged 18 and above have missing total income. For comparability, we code the
2000 missings as zeroes. This is not a correct procedure in terms of a cross-sectional analysis. However, it is precisely
what we believe happened to the 1995 data, so is desirable in terms of preserving comparability across survey years.
Note that this decision aﬀects only our models for who receives income.
9 We excluded individuals who aged more than a year from September to December, whose race and/or gender
changed, or who simply are not present in either the LFS or IES.
10 In 1995 and 2000, valid information on the variables listed was available for all but 739 and 772 observations,
respectively.
63. A Descriptive Analysis
We begin with a simple descriptive analysis, highlighting the basic patterns guiding our investiga-
tions. Figure 1 presents kernel density estimates of log real individual income (in 2000 Rand) for
1995 and 2000 for individuals 18 and older.11 This ﬁgure motivates almost everything that follows.
The top panel gives the distributions for men while the bottom panel does so for women. For our
purposes, there are three key aspects of Figure 1.
First and foremost, log real individual incomes declined between 1995 and 2000. For both men
and women, the 2000 distribution lies clearly to the left of the 1995 distribution. With the exception
of the very highest incomes, the shift is evident throughout the support of the distribution.
Second, incomes are generally lower for women than for men, and the decline in log real income
is more severe for women than it is for men. In Figure 1, and throughout the paper, we report
results for men and women separately. We do so because we ﬁnd that males and females fare quite
diﬀerently and so combining them often obscures more than it reveals. For example, women appear
to have been joining the labor force during our period of study, while men appear to have been
exiting the labor force.
Third, government old age pensions are a dominant form of income. These pensions are re-
sponsible for the large spike in each of the panels of Figure 1.12 Pensions are especially important
for women, as evidenced by the relatively larger mass near the typical pension income. Women
become eligible for the old-age pensions at age 60 and men at age 65.
The data underlying Figure 1 are summarized in Table 1. This table presents more readily in-
terpretable magnitudes of the decline in incomes throughout the distribution and presents separate
information for wage and salary income only as well as pension income only.13 Although South
African incomes declined virtually throughout the distribution, the change is starkest in the lower
half of the distribution. For example, for men, the 1st and 5th percentiles in 2000 total real income
are both roughly one-half what they were in 1995; the 10th through the 75th are roughly one-third
11 In all the results in this paper, we limit the sample to individuals 18 and older unless otherwise noted.
12 For both men and women earning pension income, the median of log pension income in 1995 is 8.84; for both
men and women, the spike in the density occurs at 8.86. In 2000, the median is 8.78 and the spike occurs at 8.80
(men) and 8.77 (women). Evidently, those earning pension income receive only small amounts of income from other
sources. According to According to Woolard (2003), the “maximum grant payable per month as approved” held
roughly constant in real terms from 1995 to 2000: 575 Rand in 1995 and 550 Rand in 2000, in 2000 prices. Observe
that ln(575 ¢ 12)
:
= 8:84 and ln(550 ¢ 12)
:
= 8:79. The actual monthly grant payable may rise to roughly double the
“maximum grant payable per month as approved”, with additional income eﬀectively taxed at a 50% rate (Woolard
(2003, fn. 2)).
13 That is, for the subset of persons with non-missing and positive wage and salary income and pension income,
respectively. The column for all income includes these two as well as other transfers and remittances.
7less than what they were in 1995; and above the 90th, incomes declined by about one-seventh. For
women, the results are essentially the same, but above the 90th percentile, women fare slightly
better than men, with roughly constant real incomes. Before proceeding, we stress that the decline
in real incomes these data document is of a large magnitude in economic terms by almost any
metric. Our key goal in this paper is to better understand this seismic shift.
When one examines the data that underlie the panels of Figure 1 as well as Table 1, it is striking
that on average real incomes fall by about the same general magnitude as inﬂation. Put another
way, one would not be terribly wrong if one posited that, on average, nominal wages and salaries
were about ﬁxed and inﬂation eroded their real values between 1995 and 2000. In real terms, the
median wage and salary in 1995 and 2000 were R21,030 and R15,600 respectively. In nominal terms,
the 1995 median was R15,000 while in 2000 it was R15,600. On ﬁrst pass, a model of nominal wage
rigidities would ﬁnd support in the aggregated descriptive data.14
The general decline in real incomes from 1995 to 2000 evidenced by Figure 1 is a robust ﬁnding
when using South African income and expenditure surveys. Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004) report
comparable real declines in household incomes. In Appendix Figure 1, we re-visit their ﬁndings
with our data and conﬁrm that the distribution of household log real incomes fell from 1995 to
2000. In the bottom panel of that same ﬁgure, we also show that the distribution of real household
expenditure also fell.
Although the survey data is unanimous in painting a dismal picture of income and expenditure
declines, national income ﬁgures paint a brighter picture with real income either holding steady or
even increasing.15 We are silent on this glaring discrepancy except to note that: i) This type of
discrepancy is not uncommon and is documented in other contexts and discussed in Deaton (2004);
and ii) The results using the survey data are replicable and all the inputs—principally survey
responses and sampling weights—are explicit and available hence yielding a relatively transparent
and replicable methodology. The same cannot be said of the national incomes data.
In each panel of Appendix Figure 1, it is especially notable that the real household-level declines
are apparent throughout the entire spectrum of income and expenditure levels. When examining
14 In this regard, it is important to note that the data we obtained from DataFirst were not previously deﬂated.
While we were assured that the data were in nominal terms and have no reason to disbelieve, skeptics will ﬁnd
comfort in the fact that the pattern of “rounding” in our incomes data is consistent with these assertions. Before
deﬂating the 1995 data, roughly 88% of reported total individual incomes have a ﬁnal digit of zero, rather than the
expected 10%. After deﬂating, 11% of reported 1995 real incomes have a ﬁnal digit of zero.
15 Which case obtains depends on which national income statistic one examines. For example, real GDP at market
prices as reported by StatsSA increases while real gross national income per capita as reported by the Reserve Bank
is about constant.
8household-level incomes and expenditures, zero incomes and/or expenditures are a non-issue—there
are none. Hence, when examining household-level data, the selection issue does not arise, except
to the extent that there is selection within the household. This would be the case, for example,
if women within a household joined the labor market while men in the same household exited the
labor market.
We next provide descriptive evidence on the endowments, returns, and selection explanations for
the declines in real incomes. Each are discussed in turn. We conclude the section by investigating
yet another possible explanation for the observed decline in real incomes—poor data integrity.
The Endowments Explanation
One candidate explanation for the decline in individual incomes is that individuals’ endowments
changed (for the worse). A decline in the level of education, for example, would be such a change
in endowments.
Table 2 speaks to the endowments explanation. The top panel gives average characteristics
of the male population by year for the entire sample as well as only for those reporting positive
income. The bottom panel reports the analogous information for females. The overwhelming
message from this table is rather simple—changes in endowments are small in terms of economic
magnitudes.16 The comparisons of mean characteristics conditioning on those with positive income
highlights some expected patterns. Those with positive incomes tend to be older, whiter, and more
urbanized. An unexpected ﬁnding is that those with positive incomes are not, on average, better
educated.17 Among those with positive incomes, mean age, education, and the percent urban are
virtually unchanged from 1995 to 2000. Thus, Table 2 suggests that the endowments explanation
is somewhat empirically suspect. There just does not appear to be the sort of large changes one
would expect if the endowments explanation was driving the shift in the distribution of individual
income. The ﬁgures in Table 2, though, are merely averages and as such are not dispositive when
it comes to explaining changes in the entire distribution.
16 Probably the sole exception to this is the increase in the fraction of the population reported as Black. This
has led some to question the 2000 sampling weights. Anecdotally, many argue that systematic emigration of South
African Whites may have been an important phenomenon between 1993 and 1995, but was largely over by 1995. On
the other hand, as recently as April 21, 2005, The Economist reported that “It is likely, however, that 250,000-plus
[Whites] have left since 1994, many of them young and talented.” Our results in Table 6 are more consistent with
The Economist than with those who argue that the emigration was mostly complete by 1995.
17 Closer investigation reveals that this pattern is due to the secular improvement in education in South Africa.
Younger individuals are less likely to receive income due to the youth unemployment problem, but are more educated
than their older counterparts. For each separate age, those with positive income are more educated than those with
no reported income (overall, as well as by survey year by gender).
9The Returns Explanation
Another explanation for the decline in individual real incomes is that the returns to individuals’
endowments changed in such a way as to lower income. To ﬁx ideas, Table 2 showed that the
mean level of education was virtually unchanged from 1995 to 2000. However, if the return to
this education were to have fallen, this would contribute to the observed decline in incomes. Table
3 provides a ﬁrst-pass examination of the returns explanation. That table lists the coeﬃcients
from standard OLS Mincer regressions of individual log income on age (and age squared), years
of education, indicators for race18 , and an indicator for pension eligibility. Separate regressions
are run for men and for women. The table also lists the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients and the standard
error of that diﬀerence.19 The estimated coeﬃcients suggest that returns did indeed change from
1995 to 2000.
Looking ﬁrst at men who reported positive incomes, the coeﬃcients on all the included races
increased. Blacks are the excluded group so one can interpret this as showing that the return to not
being Black increased. Somewhat surprisingly, the return to being White increased almost twenty
points after the White government stepped down and the African National Congress assumed
power. The return to being Coloured also increased 20 points and this too is somewhat surprising
since anecdotal evidence often suggests that Coloured workers are the ones being left behind. (The
argument is that Whites inherited positions of privilege and that Blacks are the main beneﬁciaries
of various aﬃrmative action programs, hence leaving Coloureds in a vulnerable position. A counter-
argument, also mostly anecdotal, is that Coloureds have beneﬁted from better schools than have
Blacks.) Both the increase in the return to being White and increase in the return to being
Coloured are precisely estimated. The return to age also increased (at standard levels of statistical
signiﬁcance). The return to years of education was virtually unchanged while the return to being
pension-eligible increased by about ﬁve points, although the diﬀerence is not precisely estimated.
For women, the pattern is similar. Again, the return to not being Black increased and the
return to being White increased dramatically. Returns to age (experience) also increased. Returns
to years of education and pension-eligibility were essentially unchanged.
18 In order to measure progress towards the dismantling of apartheid, the post-apartheid government continues to
monitor the four race demarcation that was inherited from apartheid. In 1995, approximately three quarters of the
population were Black, just over 10 percent were White, just under 10 percent were Coloured, and about 3 percent
were Asian/Indian. See UNDP (2003).
19 See notes in Table 3 for details on how these standard errors were computed.
10The Selection Explanation
Figure 1 showed the shifts in the distribution of log income. These ﬁgures do not include individuals
who earned zero incomes. To the extent that the set of individuals who earn income might change
over time, a selection issue arises. For example, if it were the case that in 2000 there were simply
more Black workers (who tend to earn lower wages) and more poorly educated workers among
the employed, these changes alone could in principle explain the observed shift in individual log
incomes (at least for the left-hand-side of the distribution). More generally, selection into income
recipiency may not be random and the likelihood of a particular individual earning positive income
may change between the sample periods. In this subsection, we provide a ﬁrst pass investigation
of the selection explanation.
Table 4 reports income recipiency rates (the fraction of the population that reported strictly
positive income) for several diﬀerent subpopulations. Although we will explore the selection expla-
nation in greater detail in our nonparametric analysis, this table illustrates some patterns in the
data that those analyses must confront. For example, overall income recipiency rates are essentially
equal in the two periods. The overall fraction of the sample reporting positive income was 58.0
percent in 1995 and it was relatively unchanged at 56.7 percent in 2000. This ﬁnding is corrobo-
rated by the unemployment data in our data sets. Although zero incomes and unemployment are
not one and the same, our data show relatively little change in unemployment from 1995 to 2000.
However, gross income recipiency rates mask stark diﬀerences by gender. For example, men in
2000 are, on average, less likely to receive any income than in 1995, while women are more likely
to receive income in 2000 than in 1995. This gender diﬀerence is a dominant pattern in the data,
evidently more important than race, age, or education. For example, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
of women’s income recipiency rate changes versus men’s income recipiency rate changes is over
10 percentage points. This diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences is essentially the same for all four population
groups and all but the youngest age ranges (where many individuals may yet be in school).
As with any descriptive analysis, the simple diﬀerences in income recipiency in Table 4 are
subject to multiple interpretations. For example, those with high levels of education are more
likely to receive income, but this could in principle be due to education itself, or to the correlation
of education with race. Conversely, education is predictive of youth, which is negatively related
to income recipiency due to youth unemployment, so diﬀerences by educational attainment may
understate the eﬀect of education.
Some of these hypotheses may be ruled out by the more disaggregated analysis of Appendix
Table 1, which reports income recipiency rates for 1995 and 2000 by cells deﬁned by age, race,
11sex, and education. The disaggregated rates reveal several interesting patterns. First, for 48 of the
54 cells for men, income recipiency rates fell between 1995 and 2000. Income recipiency rates fell
precipitously for White men.
Second, and conversely, for 34 of the 54 cells for women, income recipiency rates rose. In
particular, Black women with twelve or fewer years of education uniformly saw improvements in
income recipiency rates between 1995 and 2000. For non-Black women, income recipiency rates
were roughly statistically equivalent.
Third, on a cell-by-cell basis, education is protective against non-recipiency of income. However,
for men, the extent to which education is protective appears to be roughly equal in 1995 and 2000.
For women, education was much less protective in 2000 than in 1995, particularly for Black women.
A more parsimonious analysis is presented in Table 5, which gives marginal eﬀects for logit
models for income recipiency in 1995 and 2000, separately by gender. Marginal eﬀects are calculated
as the sample average of the derivative of the conditional probability of receiving income.20 Turning
to the coeﬃcients, we see that in 1995, White men were 28.6 percentage points more likely than
Black men (the excluded category) to receive a positive income. By 2000, that ﬁgure had declined to
13.9 percent. The conditional “advantage” to being White declined almost 15 percentage points—a
decline that was both large and precisely estimated. Similarly, the advantage enjoyed by Indian
men in terms of income recipiency also declined relative to Black men. For women, patterns are
similar but more muted.
The conditional impact of pension eligibility is essentially unchanged across years. This suggests
that diﬀerential take-up rates for pensions in 1995 and 2000 are not important when considering
the selection explanation.
The fact that so many of the diﬀerences in Table 5 are non-zero (and precisely so) buttresses
the key message from Table 4—selection may be important. For example, suppose Black women’s
income recipiency rates rose. Suppose these women earn relatively low wages. Their inclusion in the
distribution of non-zero incomes will tend to give more mass to the lower tail even if endowments
and returns to those endowments remained constant. On the other hand, Figure 2 suggests that
20 That is, if ˆ ¯ are the estimated logit coeﬃcients, and P(Di = 1jXi) = F(X0
i¯) where F(t) = et=(1+et), then the




ˆ ¯)ˆ ¯, where f(t) ´ F0(t) = et=(1+et)2, and Vi is a sampling weight that
sums to one. Standard errors for the marginal eﬀects, reported in parentheses, are calculated by the delta-method.
Speciﬁcally, deﬁne g(¯) =
Pn
i=1 Vif(X0







the derivative of g(¢) with respect to ¯, where f0(t) = et(1 ¡ et)=(1 + et)3 and k is the number of parameters to
be estimated. Then the square-root of the diagonal of ˆ V [g(ˆ ¯)] = Dg(ˆ ¯)0 ˆ V [ˆ ¯]Dg(ˆ ¯) is a consistent estimate of the
standard deviation of the marginal eﬀects, where ˆ V [ˆ ¯] is the estimated variance matrix for the logit coeﬃcients,
calculated using the so-called “cluster” option at the level of the household.
12if selection is at work, then it must be of a relatively complicated variety. This ﬁgure gives age
proﬁles for mean log total income separately for men and women for 1995 and 2000. Despite their
very diﬀerent patterns in regards to income recipiency over time, the experience of men and women
have been remarkably similar in terms of the erosion of real income. Roughly speaking, men and
women experienced equal magnitudes of income decline, with young people bearing the brunt of
the burden. We reserve a more careful analysis for Section 4.
The “Bad Data” Explanation
There is, of course, another explanation for the shift in the distribution of income and that is that the
data are somehow contaminated in a way that makes 1995 versus 2000 comparisons simply invalid.
This is always a lurking suspicion when using repeated cross-sections of data. These concerns, as
noted above, are alleviated due to the similarity of the survey instruments over time and the fact
that the same government organization (Statistics South Africa) conducted both surveys. Still, it
is worthwhile conducting some analyses to investigate the integrity of the data. Toward that end,
Table 6 examines means of education and race for given cohorts.
Abstracting from emigration, these means should be similar in 1995 and 2000, because race is
immutable and most individuals are no longer enrolled in school. For example, in the ﬁrst row
of Table 6 we compare the mean of the indicator variable for White for the cohort born between
1931 and 1935. The reported diﬀerence is in fact zero. For two of the male cohorts, there are
statistically signiﬁcant declines in the fraction of the population that is White although these
declines are modest. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some small declines are perhaps to be
expected since there has probably been some emigration by Whites. There are also modest but
statistically precise declines in White females in these same cohorts as well as two others. There
are no statistically signiﬁcant changes for any of the male or female Coloured and Indian cohorts.
The bottom panel computes mean education levels by gender and cohort. For those cohorts in
the middle of the age distribution, there are statistically signiﬁcant declines in the average number
of years of education for both men and women while for the others there are no such changes.
Although the exact magnitude of the diﬀerences vary by gender and cohort, when the diﬀerences
are precisely estimated they are on average about a half a year. With a return to an extra year
education at a bit below twelve percent (cf. Table 3), a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests
that the diﬀerent educational endowments could explain around a six percent income decline for
about half of the cohorts (and not the cohorts with the largest numbers of people). While the
13declines in reported education levels for some cohorts give one pause, they are too small to explain
the large income declines actually observed throughout the income distribution.
Finally, it is important to realize that even if the surveys were implemented to perfection, one
would not expect to see all zeroes in the column of diﬀerences. The two data sets are not a panel
so diﬀerent individuals comprise each cohort. While conventional wisdom suggests emigration had
substantially slowed by 1995, it may not have been complete by then, and it is (presumptively) not
random across race and education. Also, diﬀerential mortality rates between 1995 and 2000 may
contribute to some diﬀerences. In sum, we conclude that the income and expenditure data and
accompanying demographic data are reliable.
Even if the income and expenditure data are spot-on, it could be the case that the price index
data are corrupted. Mechanically, mis-measured price indexes will generate mis-measured real
income changes. We use price index data provided to us directly by Statistics South Africa.21
Although we use an aggregate CPI to adjust incomes, we have obtained much of the disaggregated
price data.22 The disaggregated price data is itself an average of actual price quotes collected by
Statistics South Africa.23 The price index data we use matches the publicly available price index
data available from both Statistics South Africa and from the Reserve Bank of South Africa. This
is not surprising since the data provided to us by Statistics South Africa are the same data used
to compile the publicly available CPI.
We have also sought evidence that might corroborate our ﬁnding of declining individual log
incomes. Figure 3 examines what has happened to the share of food expenditure as a fraction of
total household expenditure from 1995 to 2000.24;25 An attractive feature of Figure 3 is that it does
not depend on the price deﬂators since each observation is the share of food in total expenditure for
a given household in a given year. The shift in the share of food expenditure is dramatic.26 From
21 The data were provided at the request of the Oﬃce of the Presidency as Leibbrandt and Levinsohn were preparing
a report for that oﬃce.
22 For 1995 and 1996, no data were stored electronically and as of May 2003, the computer system used for
compilation of the CPI could only store 24 months of data. This information as well as a description of how the
disaggregated price data are used to create the CPI are from a personal letter dated May 3, 2003 from P.J. Lehohla,
the Statistician General of StatsSA to one of the authors.
23 For example, for mealie meal, approximately 30 price quotes are obtained for a given province.
24 We are grateful to Jere Behrman for suggesting this ﬁgure.
25 A more detailed examination of food expenditure on a per capita basis for South Africa (and several other
countries) can be found in Deaton and Paxson (1998). That study uses a data source, the 1993 LSMS survey, that
we do not use because questions are asked in a very diﬀerent way making comparisons with 2000 problematic.
26 For comparison purposes, the food expenditure questions for 1995 and 2000 are identical with one minor excep-
141995 to 2000, the distribution of the share of household expenditure devoted to food shifts sharply
to the right. In 1995, the distribution peaks at around 20 percent. While there is a remnant of
that peak in 2000, the distribution ﬂattens out. The distributions cross at about 35 percent. After
2000, there are more households spending over 35 percent of expenditure on food and few spending
less compared to 1995. This is entirely consistent with a substantial decline in real income, and
this ﬁgure does not depend on either income or price deﬂater data.
In sum, we stand behind the quality of the data that we analyze, particularly in regards to our
general conclusions. We seriously doubt, for example, that the decline in real incomes we document
here is an artifact of faulty sampling or mistakes in processing. Essentially, the data we analyze
give every indication of being of the caliber of the standard repeated cross-section household survey
conducted in any developed country.
Figure 1 set the stage. It cleanly illustrated the motivation for the rest of the paper. Table
2 then provided descriptive evidence suggesting that the endowments explanation is unlikely to
be important. Table 3 examined changes in returns in an exceedingly simple way. This ﬁrst-pass
reinforces the possibility that changes in returns might, at least in part, be behind the evidence
in Figure 1. Tables 4 and 5 lend some credence to the selection explanation. Finally, Table 6
and Figure 3 suggest that simply writing oﬀ the decline in incomes as an artifact of the data is
presumptive (and perhaps wrong). We now turn to a more powerful approach to investigating the
endowments, returns, and selection explanations.
4. A Nonparametric Approach
In this section, we apply relatively simple nonparametric techniques to investigate the endowments,
returns, and selection explanations for the shift in the distribution of individual log real incomes
displayed in Figure 1. Each possible explanation is analyzed in turn. For each explanation, we ﬁrst
describe our methodology in general terms. We then present an algorithm or “recipe” to explain
just how to implement the methodology. This may be helpful since while some of the methods may
appear daunting, they are in practice pretty simple.27 We then discuss results for the particular
explanation under consideration.
tion. In 2000, expenditure on baby food was a separate section of the survey instrument. These questions, though,
were present and identical in the 1995 survey instrument also, but in 1995, they did not comprise a separate section
of the food expenditure survey. That is, the diﬀerence is purely cosmetic.
27 Some of the nonparametric techniques we use were developed in the course of working on the substantive
question that is the topic of this paper. In a companion paper, Levinsohn and McCrary (), two of us report technical
details, give computer code for implementing the estimators we describe here, and report results from Monte Carlo
simulations.
15Before proceeding, we note that the counterfactual questions we pose and estimate in this
section are similar to those explored by several diﬀerent authors. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2004)
discuss a quantile regression approach to estimating the counterfactuals discussed in Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce (1993), building on the quantile regression methodology of Machado and Mata (2005).
The reweighting approach that inspires our own methodology was described in DFL and further
ampliﬁed by Lemieux (2002).
The endowments explanation: Methodology
To investigate the role that changes in endowments might have played in shifting the distribution
of log real incomes, we straightforwardly apply the approach of DFL. We start by setting notation.
The density functions for income in periods t and t0 may be written as
f(yjT = t) =
Z
g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t)dx (1)
and
f(yjT = t0) =
Z
g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t0)dx (2)
respectively, where T is a random variable describing the year from which a given individual in
the pooled dataset of observations from both survey years is drawn, g(yjx;T = t) is the density of
individual income evaluated at y, given that the observable attributes28 of the individual, X, are
equal to x and that the survey year is t, and h(xjT = t) is the density of attributes evaluated at x,
given that the survey year is t. It is perhaps helpful to think of g(yjx;T = t) as the function that
“translates” observable attributes into income. Were this a traditional parametric regression of
income on individual endowments for a given year t, the density of individual income, f(yjT = t),
would be analogous to the dependent variable, income; h(xjT = t) would be analogous to the
endowments data; and g(yjx;T = t) would be analogous to the returns to those endowments.
We will be interested in how the density of individual income changes if attributes and/or
returns to those attributes changed. To do so, it is necessary to deﬁne precisely what we mean
by these “counter-factuals”. Suppose that we are interested in how the distribution of income in
period t would diﬀer, were the endowments as they were in period t0. That is, what if individuals’
endowments were those that obtained in 2000 (t0) instead of the actual 1995 (t) endowments? We
denote this counter-factual by ft!t
0





g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t0)dx: (3)
28 Throughout the paper, we refer interchangeably to “observable attributes”, “attributes”, “endowments”, and
even “observables”.
16Notationally, the subscript “h” indicates that it is the density of attributes, or h(xjT = t), that
is being changed from an actual to a counter-factual density. The superscript, “t ! t0” indicates
that in this counter-factual, we are going to start with data from period t and use statistical
techniques, in particular a re-weighting scheme, to transform the actual density of attributes from
the h(xjT = t) that reigned in period t to the counterfactual density h(xjT = t0) that reigned in
period t0.29
Two speciﬁc examples help to further ﬁx ideas. If we wanted to ask what the 2000 (t0) distri-
bution of income would look like if instead endowments were distributed as they were in 1995 (t),





g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t)dx: (4)
This would involve using data from 2000 and using a re-weighting scheme to make the density of
endowments “look like” the density of endowments in 1995. If we wanted to ask what the 1995
distribution of individual income would look like if returns to endowments were as they were in





g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t)dx: (5)
Comparing equations (4) and (5), we see that the notation conventionally used to describe counter-
factuals is somewhat inspeciﬁc; the right-hand-sides of (4) and (5) are identical, but ft
0!t
h is based
on data from t0 while ft!t
0
g is based on data from t. Moreover, these two distributional parameters
pertain to counterfactuals which are conceptually entirely distinct.30
The fundamental insight from DFL is that the counter-factual in (3) is easy to implement using
a re-weighting idea. We ﬁrst describe how this is done and then show how this insight can be
extended straightforwardly to the other counterfactuals. The re-weighting idea of DFL is based on




P(T = t0jX = x)
1 ¡ P(T = t0jX = x)
. P(T = t0)




29 As we describe in more detail below, the notation is modular. For example, ft0!t
h (y) would indicate a counter-
factual density one would estimate starting with data from period t0 and using a re-weighting scheme to transform
the density of attributes from h(xjT = t0) (the actual attribute density) to h(xjT = t) (the counter-factual attribute
density).
30 This reinterpretation immediately suggests that we could also view the the right-hand-side of equation (2) as
addressing the counter-factual: “What if individuals in 1995 had the endowments from 2000 instead of the actual
1995 endowments, and enjoyed the returns to endowments that obtained in 2000, instead of the actual 1995 returns?”
We describe below how to compute this counterfactual as well.
17In words, ¿t!t
0
h (x) is just the ratio of the conditional odds to the unconditional odds.31
This turns out to be precisely the weighting function needed to conduct the endowments counter-







g(yjx;T = t)h(xjT = t0)dx =
Z










which diﬀers from (1) only by the weight ¿t!t
0
h (x). Consequently, if we could estimate the weighting
function ¿t!t
0
h (x) then we could compute the counter-factual (3) easily using a weighted density
estimate of incomes (with a density estimation technique of our choosing).
Considering the structure of the weighting function, estimation of the counter-factual is quite
straightforward.32 Predicted probabilities b P(Ti = t0jXi) may be obtained from a binary choice
model (such as a binary logit) that uses individual attributes Xi to predict the probability of
an observation coming from year t0 in the pooled data set of observations from both years. The
predicted probability ˆ P(Ti = t0) may be obtained from the relative frequency, and we may reweight
the data using a plug-in version of (6). This procedure is summarized in the following algorithm:
31 The odds of an event that occurs with probability p is p/(1 ¡ p). The expression in the display is not to be
confused with the “odds ratio” which is the ratio of the odds for the treatment group to the odds for the control
group in the randomized control trial.
32 The ease with which DFL can in fact be implemented may not be obvious to most readers of the original
Econometrica paper, although the description in Johnston and DiNardo (1996) is admirably simple. To facilitate
replication, all of the code used in our paper will be available at http://www.umich.edu/»jmccrary. All estimation
is programmed in Stata version 8.2.
18Endowments Algorithm
1. Using the pooled dataset of observations from both survey years, estimate the fraction of
observations with Ti = t0, or ˆ P(Ti = t0).
2. Using the pooled dataset, estimate a logit for Ti = t0 using individual attributes, or endow-
ments, Xi. Store the predicted values from the logit, or ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi).




ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi)
1 ¡ ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi)
. ˆ P(Ti = t0)
1 ¡ ˆ P(Ti = t0)









K((Yi ¡ y)=b)Vi ˆ ¿t!t
0
i;h
where Yi is log income, K(¢) is a kernel function, b is a bandwidth parameter, and Vi is
the sampling weight. If the survey is self-weighted, then Vi = 1
n, where n is the number of
observations from year t. If the sample is not self-weighting, then one should verify that the
estimated probabilities from steps 1 and 2 employ the sampling weight.
For comparison, note that the conventional density estimate for actual log incomes in year t is






This makes it clear that estimating the counterfactual density function is no more challenging than
estimating a density function, given an estimate of the weighting function.33
Suppose we were interested in a very speciﬁc counter-factual pertaining to endowments, such as
“What would the distribution of log income in 2000 look like, were the educational endowment
of the population as it was in 1995?” To answer this question, we interpret (3) as an integral
over the distribution of education alone. Then we apply the Endowments Algorithm, with Step
2 being a logit model for 1(Ti = t0) using education (Xi, a scalar) as a predictor—and possibly
higher powers of education, depending on how nonlinear in Xi one believed the true conditional
probability P(Ti = t0jXi) to be.
We in fact focus on a broader counter-factual: “What would the distribution of log income in
2000 look like, were all endowments to be as they were in 1995?” To answer this question, we
33 It is conventional to assess the counter-factual by comparing ˆ ft!t0
h (y) to ˆ f(yjTi = t) and ˆ f(yjTi = t0). While it
turns out that it makes little diﬀerence in our application, we believe that the “returns and endowments” counter-
factual described below is a slightly better basis for comparison than ˆ f(yjTi = t0).
19interpret (3) as an integral over the distribution of all observables—education, race, and so on.
Step 2 of the Endowments Algorithm is then a logit model for 1(Ti = t0) using all observables (Xi,
a vector)—and possibly powers and cross-products of the elements of Xi.34
The endowments explanation: Results
Implementing the above methodology requires specifying a measure of income, Yi, as well as the
components of the vector of individual attributes, Xi. In the notation above, t is 1995 while
t0 is 2000. Our measure of individual income is the log of total individual income. It includes
wage income as well as income from all other sources (such as pension income).35 The vector
of individual attributes is comprised of dummies for whether the individual is Black, Indian, or
Coloured (with White the excluded group), age, age squared, a dummy that takes on the value
of one if the individual is male and over 65 or if the individual is female and over 60 (to capture
pension eligibility), and years of education. These are our measures of an individual’s endowments.
An intuitive way to examine the results is to compare the estimated distribution ˆ ft!t
0
h (y) to the
actual 1995 distribution. In words, the estimated distribution is illustrating what the distribution
of income would have been in 1995 if endowments were those that obtained in 2000 but all else was
the same.
The results are given in Figure 4. The top panel is for the male subsample while the bottom panel
is for the female subsample. These diagrams are easy to interpret. For both men and women, the
reweighted distribution essentially lies coincident with the 1995 actual distribution. For men, the
upper tail of the density estimates diverges slightly, but the diﬀerences are quite minor compared to
the important diﬀerences between the 1995 and 2000 density estimates of Figure 1. Consequently,
speaking loosely, we might say that substituting 2000 endowments for 1995 endowments gives
rise to the 1995 actual distribution of income. We interpret this as convincing evidence that the
endowments explanation makes virtually no headway in explaining the shift in individual incomes.
This is broadly consistent with the descriptive analysis. Two additional comments are relevant.
First, recall that the descriptive analysis showed an increase in the fraction of the population that
was Black. Because Black South Africans earn less, one might have imagined that this simple
demographic diﬀerence could have possibly explained the decline in incomes. Indeed, in the logit
34 We do so because we ﬁnd little evidence that any individual endowment explains the decline in real incomes. The
focus on the omnibus endowments counter-factual is thus a summary of this disaggregated evidence.
35 In many developing countries, income in the form of self-production of food is an important component of income
and exactly how this is modeled becomes important. In South Africa, income attributed to self-production is
negligible. It is not included in our deﬁnition of individual income since it is only reported at the household-level.
20model for P(Ti = 1jXi), race is highly predictive (c.f. Appendix Table 2). However, the results of
Figure 4 indicate that the Black wage penalty is not nearly large enough to account for the overall
decline in real incomes. Second, if it were the case that the explanatory variables that comprise Xi
in fact don’t “explain” income, then the results in Figure 4 would be non-informative. However,
the results in Table 3, discussed in the descriptive analysis section section, above, indicate that this
is not the case.
The returns explanation: Methodology
Here, we are interested in how the distribution of income in period t would diﬀer, were the returns to
observables as they were in period t0. Following the notation of above, we label this counter-factual
by ft!t
0





g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t)dx (8)
It turns out that this counter-factual, too, is easy to implement using a re-weighting idea. We again
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g(yjx;T = t0)h(xjT = t)dx =
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as before. Estimation of ¿t!t
0
g (x;y) is no more diﬃcult than estimation of ¿t!t
0
h (x), as the following
algorithm makes clear:
21Returns Algorithm
1. Using the pooled dataset, estimate a logit for Ti = t0 using Xi. Store the predicted values
from the logit, or ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi).
2. Using the pooled dataset, estimate a logit for Ti = t0 using Xi and log income Yi. Store the
predicted values from the logit, or ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi;Yi).




ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi;Yi)
1 ¡ ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi;Yi)
. ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi)
1 ¡ ˆ P(Ti = t0jXi)








K((Yi ¡ y)=b)Vi ˆ ¿t!t
0
i;g
where the notation is as described in the Endowments Algorithm, and the cautions regarding
the sampling weight Vi continue to apply.
We focus on the broad counter-factual—“What would the distribution of log income in 2000 look
like, were the returns to all observables as they were in 1995?” To answer this question, we interpret
(8) as an integral over the distribution of all observables. Step 1 of the Returns Algorithm is then
a logit model for 1(Ti = t0) using all observables (Xi, a vector)—and possibly powers and cross-
products of the elements of Xi. Step 2 is the same logit model but with Yi included—and possibly
interactions of Yi with Xi and the powers and cross-products of elements of Xi. As advertised, this
is pretty simple.
As noted in the above discussion of the Endowments Algorithm, it is straightforward to consider
changes in but one or even a subset of the endowments. For example, we might want to know what
the 1995 distribution of income would look like if the age proﬁle was that of 2000. The thought
experiment in this instance is well-deﬁned, because both age and education are observable, and it
is possible to imagine altering an individual’s education without altering the individual’s age.
The same is not true of changes in the returns to endowments. For example, one might wonder
what would have happen to the 1995 distribution of income, were the return to education to be
that which obtained in 2000 and other returns were unchanged—however, in all but one case,
this thought experiment is ﬂawed. If income is an additively separable function of each individual
endowment, then it is straightforward to conceptualize changing only one return while holding the
others constant. However, if the mapping from endowments to income is more complex, then the
situation is more subtle.
22A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose income (Y ) is a function of only age (A) and
schooling (S) and the conditional expectation of Y given A and S is not quite additively separable:
E[Y jA;S] = ¯1A + ¯2S + ¯3A ¢ S
The return to a factor is the partial derivative of income with respect to that factor. Hence the







In this case—which we emphasize is only a modest departure from additive separability—the
thought experiment of changing the return to age but not that of education makes sense only
if we restrict ¯3 to be the same across time periods. If changing the return to education involves
changing ¯3, then that thought experiment simultaneously changes the return to age. The problem
illustrated in this example is quite general and indicates that the idea of changing returns “one at
a time” is essentially only well-posed given very speciﬁc parametric models.
The leading case in which one can decompose the returns explanation on a return-by-return basis
was already discussed in Section 3 (Table 3). There, we saw that the return to education for males
was about 0.11 in 1995 and 2000. The same result applied to women. These aggregated coeﬃcients
mask considerable variation across age, race, and gender.
Disaggregated returns to education are given in Appendix Table 3. Separate regressions are
run for each of six age cohorts for each race for each gender in each year. The table also lists
the diﬀerence in estimates for each cell, whether that diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level, and the number of observations in each cell. The ﬁrst message of Appendix Table 3 is
the dispersion of estimates across cells. This indicates that the data essentially reject the simplest
versions of additive separability at a cross-sectional level. Second, there are some important patterns
in the changes over time. This speciﬁcally rules out the validity of returns counterfactuals conducted
“one at a time”. In general, returns to education for the younger cohorts of Black men and women
fell between 1995 and 2000. The declines were substantial—on the order of 4 or 5 percentage points
(i.e., a decline from a return of 14% for an extra year of education to a return of 9%). At the same
time, there were substantial increases for these same younger cohorts of White men and women.
The fact that the changes in returns are especially evident for the younger cohorts could be taken
to suggest that these diﬀerences over time may be picking up the impact of new hires or ﬁres (in a
system in which seniority matters).
23The returns explanation: Results
We turn now to estimating the distribution of income that results when all the 2000 returns are
applied to the 1995 data. The results of the logit regressions needed for steps 1 and 2 of the
“Returns Algorithm” are reported in Appendix Table 2. As can be seen in the top panel of this
table, other than income, the included regressors are the same as those used in the endowments
explanation. We estimate (10) separately for men and women and report the resulting distributions
in the panels of Figure 5. The solid line gives the actual 1995 distribution while the open circles
give the reweighted 1995 distribution. Looking over the reweighted density, it appears that the
“omnibus” returns counterfactual is nearly suﬃcient for explaining the discrepancy between the
1995 and 2000 (2000 actual density not shown; cf. Figure 1). However, as discussed above, it does
not appear possible to tailor this approach to better understand which returns might have changed.
When trying to understand which returns changed and why, Figure 5 is usefully complemented
by Appendix Table 3. Taken together, there seem to be two key patterns underlying the changes
in returns—changes which themselves go a long way toward explaining the shift in the distribution
of individual incomes. First, for Whites and Coloureds, the return to skill for those entering the
labor market (ages 18-25) rose sharply. For Blacks, these returns fell. Falling average returns to
education for Blacks and rising average returns to education for Whites have been noted before
by Keswell (2004). Indeed, Keswell suggests that, controlling for age, the diﬀerence in returns had
moved from close to zero in 1993 to close to 40 percent in 2002. Second, for Whites and Coloureds,
returns for those in the other age cohorts either rose or stayed about constant while for Blacks,
these returns either fall or stayed about constant.
For these ﬁndings to emerge out of the ﬁrst ﬁve years following apartheid in South Africa is
perhaps surprising, at least at ﬁrst glance. We discuss this more in Section 5 below.
24Considering the endowments and returns explanations together: Methodology
Finally, suppose that we are interested in how the distribution of income in period t would diﬀer,
were the observables and the returns to observables as they were in period t0. We label this counter-
factual by ft!t
0
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g;h (x;y) only depends on the predictions P(T = t0jX = x;Y = y) and P(T = t0), we
may estimate ˆ ft!t
0
g;h (yjTi = t) using conventional density estimation techniques after estimating
one binary choice model (to obtain the numerator in (12) and a relative frequency (to obtain the
denominator).
When we simultaneously consider the endowments and the returns explanations, we are asking
if it is possible to re-weight the 1995 data in such a way (allowing returns and endowments to
change) so as to re-create the 2000 distribution. To the extent that the re-weighted distribution
does not match the actual 2000 distribution, the most straightforward interpretation is that the
support restrictions implicit in DFL are violated. That is, it may not be possible to re-weight data
from one period or one group and obtain the equivalent distribution as in another time period or
group. For example, it is conventional in studies of the impact of unions on wages not to attempt to
re-weight the distribution of unionized workers to obtain counterfactuals pertinent to non-unionized
workers. This is because there are, for example, few unionized workers with law degrees, but many
non-unionized workers with law degrees. Rather, it is conventional to attempt to re-weight the
distribution of non-unionized workers to obtain counterfactuals pertinent to unionized workers.
This is because many non-unionized workers “look like they should be unionized”.
25We argue that a good interpretation of ft!t
0
g;h (y) is that this is “the best that the data from period
t can do” in terms of replicating the distribution that reigns in period t0. We also note that this
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1 ¡ P(T = t0jX = x;Y = y)
¡
P(T = t0jX = x)
1 ¡ P(T = t0jX = x)
´. P(T = t0)
1 ¡ P(T = t0)
(14)
which is proportional to the gain in the prediction that T = t0 attributable to the event Y = y. The
empirical version of this decomposition is similar. We note that this provides a formal justiﬁcation
for a procedure similar to, but distinct from, that pursued by DFL.
Considering the endowments and returns explanations together: Results
Figure 6 reweights the 1995 actual distribution using ¿t!t
0
g;h (x;y) as weights, allowing both endow-
ments and returns to change. Results for men are given in the top panel and results for women are
given in the bottom panel. For both men and women, the simulated distribution is almost coinci-
dent with the actual 2000 distribution. We stress that in other contexts, this need not be so—in
such a case, it would be appropriate to compare a counter-factual such as ft!t
0
h (y) to ft!t
0
g;h (y),
rather than to compare ft!t
0
h (y) to f(yjT = t0) (currently common practice).
The selection explanation: Methodology
The counter-factuals we have considered, like the original work of DFL, abstract from problems
with selection. This will be valid if selection into income recipiency does not change between the
two survey years (since we are explaining log incomes). In some cases, this will be an appropriate
simpliﬁcation. However, given the many changes in the South African labor market from 1995 to
2000, ignoring selection could lead to serious errors. For example, as we saw in Table 1, women
26are somewhat more engaged in the labor market in 2000 than in 1995. However, we have little
sense of what those who entered between 1995 and 2000 would have earned in 1995, had they
worked. Similarly, men became less attached to the labor market over this period, and we do not
know what those who exited would have earned, had they continued working. Before proceeding,
we would like to emphasize the extent to which any selection story must be complex—as noted
above, several population groups have distinct patterns of selection changes but common patterns
of income decline.
To assess the potential relevance of the selection story, we implement a bounding procedure pro-
posed by Lee (2004).36 Using this procedure, we may bound the true 1995-2000 income diﬀerence
under conservative assumptions.37 We begin by describing Lee bounds in the context of a com-
parison of average log incomes between the two survey years, with no controls for individual level
covariates. We then extend the analysis to cells deﬁned by age, race, and gender. 38 Suppose that
the data are generated according to
Yi = ¹ + ¼Ti + vi
Di = 1(±0 + ±2Ti + wi > 0)
(15)
where Yi is the log of individual i’s income, Ti is an indicator variable for the year from which
the data are observed, ¹ is a constant, and vi is an individual-level idiosyncratic shock to income.
While vi and Ti are assumed orthogonal in the overall population, selection may result in income
shocks being correlated with Ti for those individuals reporting positive income. Income, Yi, is
observed only if Di = 1, and Di = 1 only if ±0+±2Ti+wi > 0 where wi is an idiosyncratic shock to
income recipiency. While wi is assumed orthogonal to Ti, wi may be correlated with vi. Intuitively,
the latter correlation allows shocks to the level of income to be correlated with shocks to income
recipiency—a somewhat natural correlation.
The parameter of interest is ¼, or the mean diﬀerence in log incomes for persons who would have
received income in both survey years. In our sample, real incomes, conditional on being positive,
are about 40 percent lower in 2000 than in 1995. If there were no selection, -0.40 would estimate
¼ well. The methodology below accounts for selection by placing bounds on ¼.
36 Lee focuses on the consequences of attrition for identiﬁcation in the randomized control trial. However, the
mathematical ideas apply equally to the analysis of changes in incomes between two time periods.
37 As will become clear, however, the critical assumption of Lee bounds is a monotonicity condition, and this is
probably only satisﬁed on a cell-by-cell basis in our application.
38 This may be thought of as the discrete covariate approach. DiNardo (2002) suggests an approach that would
extend Lee bounds to continuous covariates.
27Because of the orthogonality of vi and Ti, ¼ is identiﬁed by E[YijTi = 1]¡E[YijTi = 0]. However,
because Yi is only observed if Di = 1, this is not an estimable quantity. It is feasible to estimate
E[YijTi = 1;Di = 1] ¡ E[YijTi = 0;Di = 1], however, this quantity may be quite diﬀerent from ¼
to the extent that vi and wi are correlated, and to the extent that ±2 6= 0.
The key insight of Lee (2004) is that it is straightforward to place approximate bounds on ¼
using the fraction of the observations from each survey year for which we have a valid measure of
income.39 To see why this is so, suppose that ±2 > 0, or that the frequency with which income is
observed rises from 1995 to 2000 (as is the case for women in our data).40 According to the model
in (15), average log income in the ﬁrst survey year may be written
E[YijTi = 0;Di = 1] = ¹ + E[vijTi = 0;Di = 1]
= ¹ + E[vijwi > ¡±0]
Lee (2004) notes that we may write the average for the second year in an illuminating way:
E[YijTi = 1;Di = 1] = ¹ + ¼ + E[vijTi = 1;Di = 1]
= ¹ + ¼ + E[vijwi > ¡±0 ¡ ±2]g
= pf¹ + ¼ + E[vij ¡ ±0 ¡ ±2 < wi · ¡±0]g
+ (1 ¡ p)f¹ + ¼ + E[vijwi > ¡±0]g
where
p ´
P(¡±0 ¡ ±2 < wi · ¡±0)
1 ¡ P(wi · ¡±0 ¡ ±2)
That is, we can think of average log income in the second year as a weighted average of log income
for the subpopulation that would have received income in both the ﬁrst and second years, on the
one hand, and for the subpopulation that would have received no income in the ﬁrst year, but
would have received income in the second year, on the other hand.
The idea behind this representation of the average for the second year is as follows. Suppose for
the moment that we knew which individuals in the second year survey had ¡±0¡±2 < wi · ¡±0, or
the subpopulation whose income recipiency is aﬀected by the economic changes occurring between
1995 and 2000. Then we could delete them from the sample and compute average log income among
39 This remains true under a heterogeneous treatment eﬀects version of (15). The key aspect of (15) is not the
particular functional form, but the monotonicity condition implied—namely that the “eﬀect” of the survey year on
the probability of being observed is of the same sign for all individuals. See Lee (2004) for details.
40 The argument is analogous for the case that ±2 < 0. If ±2 = 0, then no selection correction is necessary.
28the remaining individuals. That is, letting Mi = 1 indicate the event ¡±0 ¡ ±2 < wi · ¡±0, we
have
E[YijTi = 1;Di = 1;Mi = 0] = ¹ + ¼ + E[vijwi > ¡±0]
so that
E[YijTi = 1;Di = 1;Mi = 0] ¡ E[YijTi = 0;Di = 1] = ¼
and the selection problem is circumvented.
In the absence of a good understanding of the selection process, it is not generally possible to
identify the subpopulation with Mi = 1. However, consider for the moment the consequences of an
extreme sort of selection, in which any given individual with Mi = 1 has a higher valued vi than
any given individual with Mi = 0. Then selecting on Mi = 0 is equivalent to trimming a fraction
p of the observations with the highest vi. Those with the highest vi are equivalently those with
the highest Yi. This reasoning leads to the insight that the natural (but infeasible) estimator for
E[YijTi = 1;Di = 1;Mi = 0], namely
Pn
i=1 YiTiDi(1 ¡ Mi)
Pn
i=1 TiDi(1 ¡ Mi)
;









where the latter two sums (in order to minimize notational complexity) assume that the data are
sorted in ascending order by Yi, the operator [[¢]] rounds a real number to the nearest integer, and
ˆ p is an estimate of p, namely
ˆ p ´
ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 1) ¡ ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 0)
ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 1)
This simple trimming idea forms the building block of the bounds. Speciﬁcally, because the
analysis above indicates that E[YijTi = 1;Di = 1;Mi = 0] ¡ E[YijTi = 0;Di = 1] is the parameter



















i=1 Yi(1 ¡ Ti)Di Pn
i=1(1 ¡ Ti)Di
; (17)
29respectively.41 Appendix A provides two examples that illustrate how the trimming works in
practice.
So far, we have discussed bounding when one observes a greater fraction of individuals in the
second survey year (as is the case in our data for women). When one observes a greater fraction
of individuals in the ﬁrst survey year (as is the case in our data for men), it is then appropriate to
trim observations from the ﬁrst year.42 Speciﬁcally, redeﬁne the trimming fraction as
ˆ p ´
ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 0) ¡ ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 1)
ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 0)
and note that now ¼ is given by E[YijTi = 1;Di = 1] ¡ E[YijTi = 0;Di = 1;Mi = 0]. Then one







i=1 Yi(1 ¡ Ti)Di
P[[n(1¡ˆ p)]]








i=[[nˆ p]] Yi(1 ¡ Ti)Di
Pn
i=[[nˆ p]](1 ¡ Ti)Di
;
respectively.
The above description is formal, precise, and necessarily somewhat notationally complex. In
contrast, the idea behind using trimming to place bounds on selection is actually pretty simple.
Before adding the complexity of cell-by-cell or multidimensional trimming, it is perhaps helpful to
provide an heuristic description of how the trimming approach to addressing selection applies to
the case at hand.
Consider ﬁrst the case of men. Results presented in section 3 showed that income recipiency
declined for males overall from 1995 to 2000. To keep things simple, we’ll pretend that the total
sample sizes were the same in 1995 and 2000; it’s just that fewer men reported positive incomes in
2000. Further, suppose that there were ten percent fewer men reporting positive incomes in 2000.
Because we have fewer positive incomes in 2000, we want to know who had income in 1995 but
did not have income in 2000. If we knew who these individuals were, we would exclude them from
41 This formulation is distinct from that described in Lee (2004) in that it emphasizes the bounds as being satisﬁed
for each sample size. (Lee’s notation instead emphasizes the (correct) idea that the probability limit of the bounds
will bound the probability limit of the infeasible estimator.) The treatment we have given here stresses that the
bounds have a highly literal ﬁnite sample justiﬁcation. This aids in intuition, but also conveys the important idea
that standard errors do not need to be adjusted to accommodate sampling error in the trimming fraction ˆ p (this
may be shown following the discussion in Section 6 of Newey and McFadden (1994)).
42 This case corresponds to ±2 < 0.
30the 1995 data and then be able to compare 1995 (after their exclusion) to 2000 and the selection
problem would have disappeared. The bounds approach assumes ﬁrst that the ten percent who no
longer earned incomes were at the very top of the income distribution in 1995, so we trim from
the top of the 1995 distribution. Having trimmed from the top, the mean of the resulting 1995
synthetic distribution is lower. If it was, say, 40 percent lower, the selection explanation (which
motivated the trimming) could explain a 40 percent decline in incomes from 1995 to 2000. At
the other extreme, it could be that the ten percent who earned incomes in 1995 but not in 2000
were at the bottom of the 1995 distribution. Trimming from the bottom of the 1995 distribution
will result in a synthetic 1995 distribution with a higher mean. Since we know that men’s mean
incomes fell from 1995 to 2000, trimming from the bottom will only exacerbate the decline. In this
case, selection will not explain the observed decline. By trimming from the top and then from the
bottom, we place bounds on the role of selection. Intuitively, for selection to explain the decline in
men’s real incomes, it would have to be the case that the top ten percent of male earners in 1995
earned very high incomes.
Next consider the case for women. For women, income recipiency rose from 1995 to 2000. We’ll
again abstract from the diﬀerent sample sizes and for purposes of this example, assume female
income recipiency rose ten percent from 1995 to 2000. In this case, we ask, “Who are these women
who earned incomes in 2000 but not in 1995?” At one extreme, they might comprise the top ten
percent of the 2000 actual distribution. Trimming, then, will result in a synthetic distribution
with a lower mean. If actual incomes fell by 40 percent, selection of this sort would exacerbate
the decline, not make it disappear. Hence selection of this sort cannot explain the decline. At the
other extreme, suppose those who earned income in 2000 but not in 1995 were at the very bottom
of the 2000 distribution. Trimming these women will result in a synthetic 2000 distribution with
a higher mean, hence the decline from 1995 to 2000 lessens. Selection, in this instance, could in
theory explain the observed decline in women’s mean log income.
Before examining results, recall that if selection is to explain the observed declines in income, it
is a selection story that works very diﬀerently for men than for women. To ﬁx ideas and stereotype,
if selection explains the declines in incomes, it might be rich doctors who retire (but don’t report
any pension or other income) and poor uneducated women who start earning incomes.
The above analysis and discussion abstracts from covariates. Lee describes the trimming idea
assuming that the observables have discrete support, in which case the above analysis may be
conducted “cell-by-cell.” This is essentially the approach we adopt. In interpreting our results, it
is important to we note that in Lee’s discussion, the focus was on the randomized control trial.
31There, it was emphasized that the treatment being studied should never make some individuals
more likely to be observed and other individuals less likely to be observed.43 In our application,
monotonicity is probably not satisﬁed globally, but may be satisﬁed on a cell-by-cell basis.44
This should be kept in mind when comparing our bounding results for broad subpopulations
with those from more narrowly deﬁned subpopulations. We turn now to results.
The selection explanation: Results
The question being asked is whether selection alone might explain the observed declines in individual
real incomes. The descriptive analysis in Section 3 clearly indicates that there were changes in the
likelihood of earning positive incomes between 1995 and 2000. Table 7 reports the results of our
non-parametric analysis of the selection explanation.
Because Lee bounds are not yet common in the literature, we take care to describe Table 7 in
some detail. The table reports selection-corrected log income diﬀerences. Following our convention
of reporting results for men and women separately, we begin with the ﬁrst two lines of Table 7.
The ﬁrst line reports results for men. In 1995, 68 percent of men reported positive incomes while
in 2000 that ﬁgure fell to 61 percent. We trim, then, from 1995 since 1995 has the higher fraction
of positive incomes. Suppose the men who left the ranks of those reporting positive income were at
the very top of the 1995 distribution. Absent these men, the resulting 1995 trimmed distribution
would have a mean log income of 9.73 and this is the ﬁgure reported in Column C. If the men who
left between 1995 and 2000 had the lowest incomes, the mean of the trimmed distribution of log
incomes is 10.19 and that is the ﬁgure reported in column E, labeled “upper bound.” Selection in
the case of men, then, could result in a mean log income between 9.73 and 10.19 with the actual
1995 ﬁgure being 9.96. In fact, mean log income fell in 2000 to 9.58 for men—the ﬁgure reported
in column G. The actual diﬀerence in mean log incomes is -0.38 as reported in column J. Columns
I and K report the bounds on this diﬀerence due to selection. Hence, mean log incomes could have
been 0.60 lower (9.58 - 10.19) or might have only been 0.15 lower (9.58 - 9.73). Those bounds on
the diﬀerence, importantly, do not bracket zero. Put another way, even the most extreme sort of
selection cannot explain the observed decline in mean log incomes for men. The last column of
43 In that case, there are additional complexities with combining the information on the bounds from all possible
cells.
44 For example, a literal interpretation of Lee would hold that the diﬀerential patterns for men and women rejects
monotonicity.
32Table 7 lists the fraction of the 1995 population who are men (0.48). Although Table 7 reports
means, it should be noted that one could also report medians or any other quantile result.45;46
Next, consider the second line of Table 7. Here we report the results for women. As noted in
columns A and B, the fraction reporting positive incomes increased so, in this case, we trim from
the 2000 distribution to obtain the synthetic distributions from which we then compute bounds.
Women’s actual mean log income in 1995 was 9.44 (column D). That ﬁgure fell in 2000 to 9.08. To
assess the scenario in which it was women at the top of the 2000 distribution who were missing in
1995, we trim these high income women in 2000. The mean log income of the synthetic distribution
falls to 8.88 (column F). Similarly, to assess the scenario in which it was low income women who
had positive incomes in 2000, we trim them. The resulting mean log income rises to 9.28 (column
G). The ﬁrst case exacerbates the diﬀerence and the diﬀerence in mean log incomes becomes -0.56.
In the second case, selection mutes the diﬀerence, and the diﬀerence becomes -0.16 (instead of the
actual diﬀerence of -0.37). Either way, selection alone cannot explain the decline in women’s mean
log income.
The next four rows investigate the selection explanation by race. For Blacks, the fraction earning
positive incomes hardly changes so there is but a very limited role for selection and indeed the
selection explanation is not very important. This ﬁnding, though, conﬂates the very diﬀerent
experiences of Black men and Black women. Findings for Coloureds are quite similar to those for
Blacks. With men and women combined, there is not much of a role for the selection explanation.
For Whites, on the other hand, the fraction earning positive incomes fell more substantially and
selection could explain the rather modest 8 percent decline in mean log income. Taking into account
the possible eﬀects of selection, this diﬀerence could have been zero. That is, zero (no diﬀerence
across years in mean log incomes) lies between the bounds reported in columns I and K. One should
note, though, that this ﬁnding conﬂates the experiences of men and women and it applies to only
16 percent of the population.
In principle, one could compute selection-corrected log income diﬀerences at much ﬁner granu-
larity than just race or gender. In Appendix Table 4, we do so for age, race and gender cells; the
structure of the table mimics that of Table 7. Appendix Table 4 contains three main messages.
45 We report means because reporting only one summary statistic keeps the table more-or-less interpretable and we
ﬁnd that means work well given we are working with log incomes. Were we working with, say, income instead of log
income, medians might be a better choice.
46 However, the trimming rule depends on the choice of estimator. Suppose that one were interested in the diﬀerence
in medians in the randomized control trial where a higher fraction of the control group was observed. Then one
would compare the median for the treatment group to ˆ Q(0:5¡ˆ p) and ˆ Q(0:5+ˆ p) where ˆ Q(¢) is the quantile function
for the control group.
33First, the declines in mean income are especially severe for younger cohorts. Young Black men and
women comprise the two largest cohorts in Appendix Table 4 and these groups have two of the
very steepest declines (0.52 for men and 0.61 for women 18-25 years old). As a general pattern,
observed mean log income declines almost monotonically with age cohort within race and gender
cells. These patterns were foreshadowed earlier by the age proﬁles of Figure 2. Second, for Blacks
who comprise most of the population, the selection explanation just cannot explain the observed
income declines, and this is true for both genders and all age cohorts. Third, there are speciﬁc
cells for which selection might be important. On the other hand, many of these comprise miniscule
fractions of the 1995 population. The youngest cohort of Black women is an exception. This cohort
comprises a full 10 percent of the population and the upper bound suggests that selection could be
explaining much (but still not all) of the huge (0.61) decline in log incomes. In this instance, the
increase in young Black women entering the labor market really might have the very low incomes
attributed to them in the trimming algorithm. Overall, though, while we acknowledge that selec-
tion may be of such a magnitude as to make it diﬃcult to compare mean log incomes over time,
we view it as unlikely that the observed declines in log incomes in South Africa are driven entirely
by selection.
The ﬁnding that selection into income recipiency may be important in explaining income declines
is corroborated by others. Casale and Posel (2002) document a large increase in Black female labor
force participation in the post-apartheid era. They note that many of these Black females have
battled to ﬁnd employment and, as zero earners, are not reﬂected in either the distribution of log
incomes nor are they reﬂected in the returns to education data. However, this increased supply
of labor presumably placed downward pressure on wages in the occupations that Black females
traditionally ﬁll. (In this way, the selection explanation interacts with the returns explanation.)
Also, Casale, Muller, and Posel (2004) note that many of these female labor market participants
have been forced to work in more informal and less well compensated sections of the labor market.
To the extent that Black female workers have begun to compete for the less skilled employment
with Black male workers, the increased supply of Black female workers would exert downward pres-
sure on male earnings (again illustrating a potential interaction between the returns and selection
explanations).
5. Truths and Reconciliation
Real individual incomes in South Africa declined substantially from 1995 to 2000, and these declines
are apparent throughout the distribution of incomes (see Figure 1 and Table 1). In general terms,
34we have shown that changes in the distribution of endowments cannot explain the shift (see Figure
4), but that changes in returns to these endowments (see Figure 5) as well as selection into income
recipiency (see Table 7) can in fact explain much of the decline. Underlying these very general
explanations, several more speciﬁc ﬁndings emerge. First, the young (from ages 18 to the early
30’s) were disproportionately impacted, and this is true for both men and women (see Figure 2).
Second, the returns to education fell dramatically for Black men and women aged 18-25. More
broadly, the return to education tended to fall for Blacks and rise or stay constant for non-Blacks.
Young Whites in particular saw pronounced increases in the return to education. Fewer Whites,
though, received income. Third, and more generally, we have shown that while selection into
income recipiency may be empirically important for explaining the shift in incomes, it is selection
of a complex variety. It is not a one-size-ﬁts-all explanation as the experiences of men and women
were quite diﬀerent.
In this section, we step back and ponder what economic phenomena might underlie our ﬁndings.
Our methodology cannot deliver the deﬁnitive answer. (It is not clear that any can.) We can,
though, identify several factors that are at least consistent with our empirical ﬁndings as well as
other factors that are not. We begin with ex ante plausible stories that are simply inconsistent
with our ﬁndings.
As noted above, changes in endowments do not explain the decline. Two such changes are em-
igration (mostly of Whites) and changes in the rate of school leaving. While anecdotes of the
South African doctor now in the U.K., Canada, or Australia are common, our results indicate
that, rare or common, changes in the racial make-up of South African income recipients does not
explain the shift in incomes. Others have noted that young Blacks are now obtaining higher levels
of education, although those Blacks that do leave school are doing so before completing secondary
education (Lam and Leibbrandt (2004)). These changing patterns of educational attainment, com-
bined with strong convexities in the returns to education in South Africa through the 1990’s (see
Lam and Leibbrandt (2004) and Keswell and Poswell (2002)) could in principle lead to shifts in
the distribution of individual incomes. In practice, they did not.
Another explanation that might explain the decline in incomes is that the data used are lousy.
That is, the decline is simply an artifact and is not real. The “bad data” explanation is not a
plausible explanation. The data are remarkably consistent in those dimensions where stability
across time is expected, the survey instruments are nearly identical, the same agency collected
both waves of the data, and the decline in incomes is corroborated by an observed increase in the
share of household expenditure devoted to food.
35It could also be that the real decline is explained quite simply by a story of sticky wages and
rising prices.47 We view the tremendous age and race heterogeneity in the decline as strong evidence
against this story. That is, wages do not appear to be particularly sticky for Whites and the non-
young.
There are several factors that are consistent with our ﬁndings. First, the 1995-2000 period
was characterized by low employment growth and even declines in formal employment. There was
substantial unemployment at the outset in 1995 and then net job creation on the order of 1.5 million
to 2 million jobs (depending on the deﬁnition used) combined with an increase in job seekers on the
order of 5 million to 6 million (Casale et al. (2004)). Simple partial equilibrium arguments suggest a
downward pressure on wages. The decline in incomes, though, was not uniform. In general, Blacks
fared worse than Whites, and this was true for both males and females, leading to a widening of
the Black-White income gap. This is clearly illustrated in Appendix Figure 2. In that ﬁgure, the
kernel density of the distribution of Black and White log incomes are graphed. It is clear that
even in absolute terms, Blacks suﬀered larger declines. Since Black incomes tended to be smaller
to begin with, the declines relative to incomes for Blacks are even greater.48 The basic facts of
unequal income declines seem to be that racial gaps widened, that the young fared worse than their
elders, and that less educated workers took bigger hits than their better educated colleagues.
Undergirding these changing returns are changing labor demand patterns in the South African
economy. Research on changing aggregate, sectoral, and occupational employment trends has
highlighted the impacts of trade and technology in driving formal sector employment changes (see
Bhorat and Hodge (1999) and Edwards (2000)). As in many developed countries, there is evidence
of an increasingly skill-intensive and technology-intensive demand structure in the South African
labor market. The same skill-biased technical change that is claimed to underlie increasing income
inequality in some developed countries may also be occurring in South Africa.
In sum, then, the diﬀerentiation of returns between Blacks and Whites may well be predominantly
driven by the fact that most Whites have education levels that beneﬁted from any skill-biased
technical change, whereas most Blacks do not. Any lingering diﬀerence in educational quality would
exacerbate this. Coloureds are in a special position to beneﬁt from these changes. Most Coloured
students complete secondary education. Notably, Hoogeveen and Ozler (2004) ﬁnd that Coloureds
47 This is diﬀerent than the bad data explanation which might argue the price deﬂators are somehow wrong.
48 The bottom panel of Appendix Figure 2 shows real income increases for wealthier White women. There are very
few of these women in the sample. More generally, the ﬁgure obscures the fact that there are about 7.5 times more
Blacks than Whites.
36were the only racial group to experience statistically signiﬁcant declines in poverty between 1995
and 2000.
The ﬁndings that Blacks have fared worse in terms of income recipiency, that Black incomes fell
more than White incomes, and that a change in returns (including those to race) explain most of
the decline in income throughout the distribution might seem surprising for the ﬁve years after the
new government took power. Any surprise, though, is muted by three factors. First, the longer-
run process of de-racialization of the labor market had started in the mid-1970s and many of the
easier gains may have already been embodied in the 1995 situation. For example, Hofmeyr (2000)
shows that Black real wages grew notably faster than White real wages in the formal sector and
in the non-primary sectors from 1975 to the beginning of the 1990’s. Particularly important for
our analysis, for less skilled Whites who owed their relatively privileged employment and earnings
positions purely to the racial allocation of employment under apartheid, most of the downward
adjustment in their earnings may have already taken place by 1995. Second, the low employment
growth meant that new hires were opening up only very limited opportunities to reorganize the
racial composition of the labor market. Third, the aﬃrmative action policies that might have been
expected to shore up Black earnings had not yet had much time, by 2000, to have much of an impact.
It was during the 1994-1997 period that such policies were being put into place culminating in the
1998 Employment Equity Act (Maziya (2001)). On implementation, this act gave ﬁrms a window
period to develop equity plans. Therefore, it may simply be unrealistic to expect aﬃrmative action
policies to have had much of an inﬂuence on the change in incomes, 1995-2000.
A combination of the slack labor market, skill biased technical change, and lingering discrepancies
in the quality of schooling reconciles fairly well with our empirical ﬁndings. There are surely other
competing explanations, but the above accords well with the data and with outside evidence. It is,
in our view, a reasonable starting place for a discussion of why incomes have fallen.
6. Conclusion
This paper makes three substantive (as opposed to methodological) points. First, based on data
from large national income and expenditure surveys conducted in 1995 and 2000, real individual
incomes in South Africa declined from 1995 to 2000. This decline was substantial and occurred
throughout the entire income distribution. Second, changes in the returns to individuals’ endow-
ments explain much of the decline. Third, selection into income recipiency changed from 1995 to
2000 and this too contributed to the observed decline in individual log incomes. The ﬁrst point
was illustrated using a careful merge of multiple data sets. The second and third points were doc-
umented by a non-parametric analysis that includes extensions to the approach of DiNardo et al.
37(1996) and implementation of a trimming idea proposed by Lee (2004) for bounding the eﬀect of
selection.
The overall picture painted by the analysis is one of declining real individual incomes between
1995 and 2000. This is rather depressing, but it should not be all that surprising to those who read
beyond government national accounts data. Several other researchers have found results that are
broadly consistent with those reported here. Perhaps the best overview of these studies is the work
of Fedderke, Manga, and Pirouz (2004) that plots measured household per capita income for each
year from 1995 to 2000 as measured by six national household sample surveys. This study shows
a marked decline in per capita incomes from 1995 to 1998. These incomes begin to rise again in
1999 and 2000 but they do not recover to 1995 levels.49 Then, recent work by Ardington, Lam,
and Welch (2005) on inequality and poverty using ten percent micro samples of the 1996 and 2001
population census reveals similarly bleak changes in household per capita incomes between 1996
and 2001. Since 2000, there have been releases of the Labour Force Survey (but no more recent
income and expenditure surveys). It is reasonable to wonder if perhaps the more recent data paint
a brighter picture. Preliminary analysis suggests that the answer is “no.” Casale et al. (2004)
analyze diﬀerent measures of income than that used in this paper. They use data from 1995 to
2003, and they do not ﬁnd substantial improvements in the 2000 to 2003 period. In summary, the
empirical evidence from household surveys in South Africa generally seems to corroborate our basic
ﬁndings.
We reviewed a number of plausible factors that could have led to this situation. Given the general
reorganization of the South African economy after apartheid, it can be argued that the ﬁnding that
real incomes did not rise does not surprise. The magnitude of the decline, on the other hand,
is surprising, and, in our view, deserves further study. Whether the coming years will see South
Africans’ gains in political freedoms paired with improvements in economic well-being remains to
be seen.
49 See their Table 2 in particular.
38Appendix A
Two Examples of the Trimming Rule
To develop intuition for the trimming rule, suppose that 100 individuals are sampled in each
survey year, but that the income recipiency rate is diﬀerent in the two survey years. This situation
is depicted in the table below:
Before Trimming After Trimming
Year 0 Year 1 Year 0 Year 1
Observe Income 70 80 70 70
Do Not Observe Income 30 20 30 20
Total 100 100 100 90
For the “before trimming data”, we see that ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 0) = 0:7, ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 1) = 0:8,
and that the trimming fraction ˆ p is (0:8¡0:7)=0:8 = 0:125. Consequently, we seek to trim 12:5% of
the 80 observations with Di = Ti = 1, or 10 observations. Before trimming, the total observation
count (third row) was split evenly between the two years. However, the count of observations for
those with income observed (ﬁrst row) was not split evenly due to diﬀerential observation rates
between the survey years. Trimming leads the selected sample of those with observed income to
mimic the overall sample with respect to the equality of the number of observations coming from
each survey year. This feature holds generally when sample sizes are diﬀerent between the two
surveys, but with respect to the fraction of the pooled observations that come from the two survey
years. This situation is depicted in the table below:
Before Trimming After Trimming
Year 0 Year 1 Year 0 Year 1
Observe Income 70 (42%) 96 (58%) 70 (45%) 84 (55%)
Do Not Observe Income 30 (56%) 24 (44%) 30 (56%) 24 (44%)
Total 100 (45%) 120 (55%) 100 (48%) 108 (52%)
As before, ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 0) = 0:7 and ˆ P(Di = 1jTi = 1) = 0:8, leading to a trimming fraction
ˆ p = 0:125. We therefore seek to trim 12:5% of the 96 observations with Di = Ti = 1, or 12
observations. This leads to 84 post-trimming observations with Di = Ti = 1. The trimming
restores the 45-55 split in the pre-trimming overall sample (third row) to the post-trimming sample
of those with observed income (ﬁrst row).
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1995 Distribution 2000 Distribution
 
Note: Figure gives weighted kernel density estimates of log real total income (2000 Rand) for men (Panel A) 
and women (Panel B) in 1995 and 2000.  All four density estimates use an Epanechnikov kernel and a 
bandwidth selector three-quarter the size of the Silverman (1986) rule-of-thumb (cf. Silverman’s Equation 
3.31).  Sample sizes for 1995 and 2000 are 21,882 and 16,893 for men, respectively, and 18,868 and 17,776 for 










































































































































































































2000 - 1995 Difference (right axis)
 
Note: Figure gives average log real total income (2000 Rand) separately by year by gender for ages 18 to 75, 
inclusive.  Sample sizes for the restricted age range for 1995 and 2000 are 21,247 and 16,387 for men, 
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Note: Figure gives weighted kernel density estimates of log real total income (2000 Rand) for men (Panel A) 
and women (Panel B) in 1995, actual and reweighted to represent the counterfactual of changing endowments 































































Note: Figure gives weighted kernel density estimates of log real total income (2000 Rand) for men (Panel A) 
and women (Panel B) in 1995, actual and reweighted to represent the counterfactual of changing returns to 
endowments to the 2000 returns mapping.  Bandwidth rule and sample sizes are as described in the stub to 































































Note: Figure gives weighted kernel density estimates of log real total income (2000 Rand) for men (Panel A) 
and women (Panel B) in 2000 (actual) and a reweighted estimate for 1995 designed to represent the 
counterfactual of changing both 1995 endowments and 1995 returns to endowments to the 2000 endowments 
and the 2000 returns mapping.  Bandwidth rule and sample sizes are as described in the stub to Figure 1.  Figure 7. Schematic View of Trimming Rule





























































































































































Missing incomes would 
have been highest incomes
trimming 
region
Missing incomes would 
have been lowest incomesTable 1. Income Distributions in South Africa, 1995 and 2000 (in 2000 Rand)
Men Women
Total Income Salary Income Pension Income All Income Salary Income Pension Income
Row 1995   2000  1995   2000  1995   2000  1995   2000  1995   2000  1995   2000 
A     B     C     D     E     F     G     H     I     J     K     L    
1 Fraction Positive 0.68 0.61 0.51 0.47 0.06 0.05 0.49 0.53 0.29 0.31 0.09 0.09
Income Statistics
2 Mean 42,378 32,286 39,106 37,696 7,711 8,111 21,742 17,561 26,535 24,801 7,107 6,849
3 S.D. 88,404 72,420 49,773 79,970 6,500 8,830 28,412 29,623 26,413 44,481 2,861 4,458
4 (90-10)/2.56 34,805 28,813 33,517 32,578 526 141 18,401 17,813 21,687 23,281 394 94
5 Skewness 14 27 8 22 12 6 7 11 3 13 12 12
6 Kurtosis 325 1,382 191 999 296 43 124 296 17 299 247 167
Log Income Statistics
7 Mean 9.96 9.58 10.04 9.78 8.86 8.83 9.44 9.08 9.67 9.34 8.83 8.76
8 S.D. 1.15 1.29 1.08 1.28 0.33 0.53 1.06 1.18 1.13 1.35 0.24 0.44
9 (90-10)/2.56 1.14 1.24 1.13 1.24 0.08 0.02 1.06 1.17 1.12 1.27 0.06 0.01
10 Skewness 0.08 -0.21 -0.27 -0.47 2.74 -2.53 -0.07 -0.10 -0.53 -0.52 0.98 -8.90
11 Kurtosis 3.06 3.81 3.09 4.49 27.13 57.38 3.16 3.94 2.81 4.30 30.92 146.61
Income Percentiles
12 1st 1,682 520 1,682 500 3,365 3,000 1,009 380 841 300 3,365 2,592
13 5th 3,365 1,800 3,365 2,100 5,047 6,120 2,243 1,200 2,019 1,200 5,215 6,000
14 10th 5,114 3,240 5,047 3,600 6,225 6,240 3,365 2,400 3,365 2,400 6,225 6,240
15 25th 8,412 6,480 11,777 8,400 6,730 6,480 6,730 4,800 7,066 4,800 6,730 6,480
16 50th 21,030 14,400 23,688 18,400 6,898 6,480 11,440 6,720 19,348 11,960 6,898 6,480
17 75th 47,780 33,600 49,210 40,600 6,898 6,480 27,339 18,000 38,056 31,920 6,898 6,480
18 90th 94,214 77,000 90,850 87,000 7,571 6,600 50,472 48,000 58,884 62,000 7,234 6,480
19 95th 134,592 120,000 126,180 132,000 11,070 12,000 68,978 68,400 75,708 82,488 8,378 6,840
20 99th 294,420 248,604 210,300 300,000 33,648 58,800 117,768 120,000 112,166 165,000 16,824 26,400
21 Observations 31,714 27,579 31,714 27,579 31,714 27,579 37,987 32,836 37,987 32,836 37,987 32,836
Note:  Table gives real income statistics pertaining to income source specified in column headings for men and women in 1995 and 2000.  South African prices increased by 
39% from 1995 to 2000 (6.8% annual rate).Table 2. Characteristics of the Population, 1995 and 2000
A. Men
Full Sample Subsample with Income
Variable 1995 2000 Difference 1995 2000 Difference
A   B   C    D   E   F   
Age 37.1     36.6  -0.47  41.7  41.1     -0.63 
(15.1)    (15.0) (0.14) (14.5) (14.9)    (0.17)
Education 8.4     8.5  0.03  8.3  8.4     0.04 
(4.2)    (4.1) (0.04) (4.4) (4.3)    (0.05)
Urban 0.60     0.61  0.010  0.65  0.66     0.014 
(0.49)    (0.49) (0.004) (0.48) (0.47)    (0.005)
Black 0.71     0.76  0.043  0.63  0.70     0.061 
(0.45)    (0.43) (0.004) (0.48) (0.46)    (0.006)
White 0.16     0.12  -0.044  0.22  0.16     -0.065 
(0.37)    (0.32) (0.004) (0.41) (0.36)    (0.005)
Coloured 0.10     0.09  -0.002  0.11  0.11     0.002 
(0.29)    (0.29) (0.002) (0.31) (0.31)    (0.003)
Log Total Income 9.96  9.58      -0.38 
(1.15) (1.29)    (0.01)
N 31,714    27,579 59,293 21,882 16,893    38,775
B. Women
Full Sample Subsample with Income
Variable 1995 2000 Difference 1995 2000 Difference
A   B   C    D   E   F   
Age 38.4     38.2  -0.21  44.0  43.7     -0.32 
(16.0)    (16.0) (0.13) (16.3) (16.5)    (0.19)
Education 7.9     8.1  0.27  7.7  7.7     0.03 
(4.4)    (4.3) (0.04) (4.7) (4.6)    (0.06)
Urban 0.53     0.58  0.051  0.59  0.60     0.014 
(0.50)    (0.49) (0.004) (0.49) (0.49)    (0.006)
Black 0.72     0.77  0.042  0.66  0.73     0.074 
(0.45)    (0.42) (0.004) (0.47) (0.44)    (0.006)
White 0.15     0.11  -0.047  0.20  0.13     -0.073 
(0.36)    (0.31) (0.003) (0.40) (0.33)    (0.005)
Coloured 0.09     0.10  0.002  0.11  0.11     -0.005 
(0.29)    (0.30) (0.002) (0.32) (0.31)    (0.003)
Log Total Income 9.44  9.08      -0.37 
(1.06) (1.18)    (0.01)
N 37,987    32,836 70,823 18,868 17,776    36,644
Notes:  Columns A, B, D, and E give weighted means (standard deviations) of key variables for specified 
subpopulations. Columns C and F give weighted difference in means (White standard errors) for key 
variables.  Full sample is those with non-missing age, sex, race, education, and statistical weight.
Subsample is the subset of the full sample with positive individual income.Table 3.  Mincer Regressions for Total Income
Men Women
1995 2000 Difference 1995 2000 Difference
Variable
White 0.979 1.176  0.198  0.602 0.984  0.382 
(0.019) (0.034) (0.046) (0.022) (0.036) (0.051)
Indian 0.576 0.635  0.058  0.528 0.578  0.050 
(0.028) (0.057) (0.066) (0.035) (0.054) (0.076)
Coloured 0.098 0.298  0.200  0.105 0.315  0.210 
(0.017) (0.027) (0.041) (0.018) (0.028) (0.041)
Age 0.096 0.114  0.018  0.042 0.066  0.023 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age-Squared/100 -0.097 -0.108  -0.012  -0.038 -0.050  -0.012 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Over Pension Age -0.024  0.032  0.056  -0.075  -0.078  -0.003 
(0.041) (0.057) (0.069) (0.029) (0.033) (0.046)
Education 0.118 0.112 -0.006  0.116 0.113 -0.004 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 21,882 16,893 38,775 18,868 17,776 36,644
Note: Table gives coefficients for weighted least squares regressions of log annual total income on individual
attributes separately for men and women for 1995 and 2000, weighted by the person weight.  Standard
error (parentheses) are so-called clustered standard errors at the level of the household.  Columns labelled
"difference" were obtained from a stacked regression using data from both survey years, taking care to
normalize the person weights to sum to one separately for each survey year.Table 4.  Income Recipency Rates 
Both Genders Men Women
Group 1995 2000 Difference 1995 2000 Difference 1995 2000 Difference
All 0.58 0.57 -0.01 * 0.68 0.61    -0.07 * 0.49 0.53 0.04 *
Population Group
Whites 0.77 0.71 -0.06 * 0.92 0.79    -0.13 * 0.64 0.63 0.00
Blacks 0.52 0.53 0.01 * 0.60 0.56    -0.05 * 0.45 0.51 0.06 *
Coloureds 0.68 0.66 -0.02 * 0.77 0.72    -0.05 * 0.59 0.60 0.01
Indians 0.64 0.62 -0.02 0.83 0.72    -0.11 * 0.44 0.52 0.07 *
Age
18-25 0.26 0.26 0.01 0.29 0.29    0.00 0.22 0.24 0.02 *
26-30 0.55 0.54 -0.02 0.68 0.61    -0.07 * 0.44 0.47 0.03 *
31-35 0.66 0.64 -0.02 * 0.79 0.71    -0.08 * 0.53 0.58 0.04 *
36-45 0.71 0.69 -0.02 * 0.86 0.76    -0.10 * 0.57 0.63 0.06 *
46-60 0.73 0.69 -0.03 * 0.89 0.76    -0.13 * 0.59 0.64 0.05 *
over 60 0.86 0.87 0.01 0.93 0.86     -0.06 * 0.81 0.87 0.06 *
Education
Less Than 11 Years 0.58 0.57 0.00 0.68 0.60     -0.08 * 0.49 0.55 0.06 *
11-12 Years 0.51 0.50 -0.02 0.61 0.56     -0.05 * 0.42 0.44 0.02
More Than 12 Years 0.81 0.75 -0.07 * 0.88 0.79     -0.09 * 0.74 0.71 -0.03 *
Note:
Table gives income recipiency rates for various subpopulations. Columns labelled "difference" give the coefficient on a dummy for 2000 in
a pooled regression of data for both years using observations only from the specified cell. The asterisk denotes statistical significance at the
5% level, and is based on the t-ratio test using standard errors clustered at the household-year level.Table 5.  Marginal Effects for Logit Models for Income Recipiency
Men Women
1995 2000 Difference 1995 2000 Difference
Variable
White 0.286 0.139 -0.148  0.076 0.014 -0.063 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021)
Indian 0.189 0.105 -0.084  -0.045  -0.047 -0.003 
(0.016) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026)
Coloured 0.152 0.133 -0.019  0.135 0.078 -0.057 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Age 0.055 0.048 -0.006  0.035 0.032 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age-Squared/100 -0.054 -0.047  0.007  -0.030 -0.025  0.005 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Over Pension Age 0.399  0.404  0.005  0.239  0.218  -0.021 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.059) (0.019) (0.023) (0.030)
Education 0.001 0.005  0.003  0.010 0.007 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log-Likelihood -14,065 -15,575 -23,219 -19,953
Observations 31,714 27,579 37,987 32,836
Note: Table gives marginal effects for coefficients from weighted logit models of total income recipiency 
separately for men and women for 1995 and 2000, weighted by the person weight.  Standard errors
(parentheses) are so-called clustered standard errors at the level of the household and were calculated by
the so-called delta-method. Table 6.  Comparability of Data
Men Women
Outcome Cohort 1995 2000 Difference 1995 2000 Difference
White 1931-1935 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.14    -0.06 *
1936-1940 0.23 0.21 -0.02 0.20 0.17    -0.03
1941-1945 0.22 0.20 -0.02 0.20 0.16    -0.04 *
1946-1950 0.21 0.17 -0.04 0.20 0.16    -0.03
1951-1955 0.18 0.15 -0.03 0.16 0.14    -0.02
1956-1960 0.16 0.13 -0.03 0.14 0.12    -0.02
1961-1965 0.14 0.14 -0.01 0.13 0.11    -0.03 *
1966-1970 0.13 0.09 -0.03 * 0.12 0.10    -0.02 *
1971-1975 0.11 0.08 -0.03 * 0.11 0.07    -0.03 *
Indian 1931-1935 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03    0.01
1936-1940 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03    0.00
1941-1945 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04    0.01
1946-1950 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04    0.01
1951-1955 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04    0.01
1956-1960 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03    0.01
1961-1965 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03    0.00
1966-1970 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03    0.01
1971-1975 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02    0.00
Coloured 1931-1935 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.09    0.00
1936-1940 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.08    -0.01
1941-1945 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.11    0.02
1946-1950 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.10    0.01
1951-1955 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.10    0.00
1956-1960 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.11    0.01
1961-1965 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.11    0.00
1966-1970 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.10 0.10    0.00
1971-1975 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.09    -0.01
Education 1931-1935 6.5 6.0 -0.6 5.1 4.6    -0.4
1936-1940 6.5 6.1 -0.4 5.8 5.1    -0.7 *
1941-1945 7.3 6.7 -0.6 * 6.1 5.9    -0.2
1946-1950 7.7 6.9 -0.9 * 6.8 6.4    -0.4 *
1951-1955 8.1 7.4 -0.7 * 7.3 6.7    -0.6 *
1956-1960 8.8 8.1 -0.6 * 8.1 7.6    -0.5 *
1961-1965 9.0 8.8 -0.2 8.7 8.3    -0.3 *
1966-1970 9.4 9.1 -0.3 * 9.4 9.3    -0.1
1971-1975 9.7 9.9 0.1 9.8 9.9    0.2
Note: Table gives cohort-specific means of specified variables for men and women in 1995 and 
2000.  Column labelled "difference" is the coefficient on a dummy for 2000 in a pooled 
regression of data for both years using observations only from the specified cohort
and taking care to normalize the person weights to sum to one separately for each survey
year. The asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and is based on the t-ratio 
test using standard errors clustered at the household-year level.Table 7. Selection-Corrected Log Income Differences
Fraction Positive 

















A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L  
Men 0.68    0.61    9.73 9.96 10.19 9.58   -0.60 -0.38 -0.15 0.48
Women 0.49    0.53    9.44 8.88 9.08   9.28 -0.56 -0.37 -0.16 0.52
Blacks 0.52    0.53    9.38 8.95 9.00   9.07 -0.43 -0.38 -0.31 0.72
Whites 0.77    0.71    10.67 10.82 11.01 10.74   -0.27 -0.08 0.07 0.16
Indians 0.68    0.66    9.48 9.55 9.62 9.43   -0.19 -0.12 -0.05 0.10
Coloureds 0.64    0.62    10.30 10.37 10.44 10.03   -0.41 -0.34 -0.26 0.03
Note: Each entry in the table gives a statistic for a specific population group described in the first column. Columns A and B give the fraction of persons
with positive income in 1995 and 2000, respectively. Columns C, D, and E pertain to average 1995 log incomes for those with positive incomes.
Column D gives the actual average, while column C gives the lower bound (when applicable) for this average and column E gives the upper bound
(when applicable).  See text for description of bounds.  When the entry is left blank, no trimming for 1995 is appropriate. Columns F, G, and H give
analogous information for average 2000 log incomes. Columns I, J, and K are also organized analogously, but pertain to the 2000-1995 log
difference.  For context, column L gives the fraction of the overall 1995 population represented by the given cell.Appendix Figure 1. Log Real Household Income and Expenditures 
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Note: Top panel of figure gives density estimates of log real household income (2000 Rand) separately by year.  




































































Note: Top panel of figure gives density estimates of log real household income (2000 Rand) separately by race 
by year for men.  Bottom panel is identical but is for women.  Appendix Table 1.  Income Recipency Rates by Age-Race-Sex-Education Cells
Less than 11 Years  11-12 Years Education More than 12 Years 
Population 
Group Age 1995 2000 Change 1995 2000 Change 1995 2000 Change
Black  Men 18-25 0.23    0.23 0.00 0.20 0.25 0.05 * 0.36    0.46   0.10
26-30 0.60    0.53 -0.07 * 0.60 0.56 -0.04 * 0.76    0.66   -0.11 *
31-35 0.69    0.65 -0.05 * 0.74 0.67 -0.07 * 0.94    0.85   -0.08 *
36-45 0.80    0.72 -0.08 * 0.82 0.73 -0.09 * 0.96    0.86   -0.10 *
46-60 0.84    0.73 -0.12 * 0.85 0.73 -0.12 * 0.94    0.83   -0.11
over  60 0.92    0.85 -0.07 * 0.92 0.86 -0.06 * 0.82    0.87   0.05
White  Men 18-25 0.69    0.46 -0.23 * 0.67 0.51 -0.16 * 0.71    0.69   -0.03
26-30 0.95    0.82 -0.13 0.96 0.87 -0.08 * 0.97    0.88   -0.09
31-35 0.94    0.86 -0.08 0.99 0.83 -0.15 * 0.99    0.75   -0.24 *
36-45 0.98    0.83 -0.16 * 0.98 0.84 -0.14 * 0.99    0.85   -0.14 *
46-60 0.96    0.80 -0.16 * 0.97 0.82 -0.15 * 0.98    0.86   -0.12 *
over  60 0.93    0.93 0.00 0.94 0.87 -0.07 * 0.92    0.81   -0.11
Coloured  and 18-25 0.56    0.43 -0.14 * 0.54 0.43 -0.11 * 0.52    0.43   -0.09
Indian  Men 26-30 0.77    0.69 -0.09 * 0.82 0.74 -0.08 * 0.87    0.74   -0.13
31-35 0.81    0.78 -0.03 0.84 0.82 -0.02 0.98    0.84   -0.14 *
36-45 0.88    0.80 -0.08 * 0.90 0.82 -0.08 * 0.98    0.89   -0.08
46-60 0.91    0.81 -0.10 * 0.91 0.82 -0.09 * 1.00    0.84   -0.16 *
over  60 0.91    0.91 -0.01 0.91 0.90 -0.02 0.97    1.00   0.03
Black  Women 18-25 0.15    0.18 0.03 * 0.14 0.20 0.06 * 0.28    0.40   0.12 *
26-30 0.36    0.43 0.06 * 0.38 0.43 0.05 * 0.69    0.55   -0.14 *
31-35 0.43    0.55 0.11 * 0.49 0.56 0.07 * 0.82    0.77   -0.04
36-45 0.52    0.61 0.09 * 0.56 0.63 0.08 * 0.91    0.85   -0.06
46-60 0.58    0.64 0.06 * 0.60 0.65 0.06 * 0.95    0.87   -0.08 *
over  60 0.85    0.92 0.07 * 0.85 0.92 0.07 * 0.84    0.95   0.11
White  Women 18-25 0.38    0.26 -0.11 0.55 0.51 -0.05 0.76    0.64   -0.12
26-30 0.42    0.55 0.13 0.69 0.67 -0.02 0.84    0.77   -0.07
31-35 0.50    0.59 0.09 0.68 0.66 -0.02 0.77    0.72   -0.05
36-45 0.57    0.54 -0.02 0.64 0.66 0.02 0.76    0.79   0.03
46-60 0.48    0.55 0.07 0.59 0.63 0.05 0.68    0.68   0.00
over  60 0.70    0.69 -0.01 0.70 0.66 -0.05 0.71    0.59   -0.11
Coloured  and 18-25 0.40    0.37 -0.03 0.43 0.39 -0.04 0.57    0.47   -0.10
Indian  Women 26-30 0.50    0.54 0.05 0.57 0.61 0.04 0.88    0.81   -0.07
31-35 0.62    0.55 -0.07 0.65 0.62 -0.03 0.88    0.89   0.01
36-45 0.56    0.59 0.03 0.58 0.61 0.03 0.93    0.78   -0.15 *
46-60 0.52    0.56 0.04 0.52 0.57 0.05 * 0.85    0.68   -0.17
over  60 0.80    0.90 0.11 * 0.79 0.91 0.11 * 0.17    0.94   0.77 *
Note: Table gives income recipiency rates for cells defined by the intersection of race, sex, and age and education
ranges. Columns labelled "difference" give the coefficient on a dummy for 2000 in a pooled regression of data
for both years using observations only from the specified cell. The asterisk denotes statistical significance at the
5% level, and is based on the t-ratio test using standard errors clustered at the household-year level.Appendix Table 2. Logit Coefficients













Black 2.754 (0.312) 5.462 (0.328)
Coloured 0.489 (0.416) 3.258 (0.425)
Indian 2.773 (0.649) 5.186 (0.749)
Age -0.234 (0.043) -0.389 (0.046)
Age-Squared/100 0.245 (0.051) 0.446 (0.057)
Log Income x Black -0.232 (0.029) -0.505 (0.032)
Log Income x Coloured 0.006 (0.040) -0.266 (0.043)
Log Income x Indian -0.217 (0.061) -0.439 (0.075)
Log Income x Age 0.026 (0.005) 0.043 (0.005)
Log Income x Age-Squared/100 -0.027 (0.005) -0.049 (0.006)
Of Pension Age -0.274 (0.620) -0.145 (0.620)
Education 0.065 (0.003) 0.082 (0.003)
Household Size -0.095 (0.004) -0.040 (0.004)
Household Head -0.004 (0.031) 0.417 (0.025)
Log Income x Of Pension Age 0.038 (0.065) 0.012 (0.068)
Log Income -0.781 (0.098) -0.896 (0.105)     
Constant 6.427 (0.938) 6.820 (0.969)
                                                             













Black 0.686 (0.032) 0.727 (0.035)
Coloured 0.624 (0.042) 0.605 (0.044)
Indian 0.566 (0.059) 0.747 (0.072)
Age -0.018 (0.005) -0.017 (0.004)
Age-Squared/100 0.022 (0.006) 0.000 (0.000)
Of Pension Age 0.038 (0.067) -0.069 (0.052)
Education 0.022 (0.003) 0.028 (0.003)
Household Size -0.100 (0.004) -0.042 (0.004)
Household Head -0.111 (0.030) 0.337 (0.024)
Constant 0.117 (0.108) -0.118 (0.102)
Note:  For each logit, the dependant variable takes a value of 1 if the year is 2000 and 0 if the year is
1995. The top panel gives the results with income included (and interacted) while the bottom panel
excludes income.Appendix Table 3.  Returns to Education by Race, Age, and Gender 
Population 
Group Age 1995 2000 Difference N
Black Men 18-25 0.11 0.06 0.05 * 2,855
26-30 0.14 0.10 0.04 * 3,364
31-35 0.13 0.12 0.01 3,569
36-45 0.12 0.13 -0.01 6,393
46-60 0.11 0.10 0.01 5,565
over 60 0.05 0.04 0.01 3,764
Coloured Men 18-25 0.14 0.12 0.03 889
26-30 0.15 0.19 -0.04 * 750
31-35 0.17 0.19 -0.02 753
36-45 0.16 0.17 0.00 1,361
46-60 0.11 0.14 -0.03 * 1,268
over 60 0.07 0.08 -0.01 663
Indian Men 18-25 0.21 0.41 -0.19 214
 26-30 0.25 0.10 0.15 * 217
31-35 0.21 0.24 -0.03 184
36-45 0.17 0.20 -0.03 368
46-60 0.17 0.20 -0.04 390
over 60 0.05 0.11 -0.06 162
White Men 18-25 0.10 0.20 -0.11 * 544
26-30 0.12 0.16 -0.04 584
31-35 0.18 0.20 -0.01 703
36-45 0.18 0.19 -0.01 1,476
46-60 0.18 0.22 -0.04 1,504
over 60 0.17 0.18 -0.01 1,235
Black Women 18-25 0.14 0.09 0.05 * 2,466
26-30 0.16 0.12 0.04 * 2,882
31-35 0.16 0.13 0.03 * 3,133
36-45 0.14 0.14 0.00 5,776
46-60 0.10 0.11 -0.02 * 5,615
over 60 0.02 0.02 -0.01 * 5,969
Coloured Women 18-25 0.16 0.22 -0.06 * 843
 26-30 0.18 0.21 -0.03 709
31-35 0.18 0.24 -0.07 * 674
36-45 0.17 0.21 -0.04 * 1,224
46-60 0.13 0.15 -0.02 1,011
over 60 0.01 0.04 -0.03 * 889
Indian Women 18-25 0.24 0.15 0.08 159
 26-30 0.23 0.20 0.03 127
31-35 0.12 0.22 -0.11 * 122
36-45 0.14 0.20 -0.07 192
46-60 0.16 0.13 0.04 185
over 60 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 134
White Women 18-25 0.09 0.15 -0.06 509
 26-30 0.14 0.27 -0.13 * 495
31-35 0.16 0.13 0.02 489
36-45 0.18 0.19 -0.01 972
46-60 0.14 0.17 -0.03 996
over 60 0.14 0.13 0.01 1,073
Note: Table gives coefficient on education for cells defined by the intersection of race, sex,
and age.  Column labelled "difference" give the difference between the 1995 and 2000
coefficients. The asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level for the
difference.  N is the number of observations in each cell. See text for more details.Appendix Table 4.  Selection-Corrected Log Income Differences by Age, Race, and Gender
Fraction 
Positive 
Income 1995 Incomes 2000 Incomes Change in Incomes 1995















A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I    J    K    L  
Black Men 18-25 0.20   0.25      9.07 8.20 8.55 8.98 -0.87   -0.52   -0.09 0.10
26-30 0.60   0.56    9.51   9.63 9.78 9.23 -0.56   -0.41   -0.28 0.05
31-35 0.74   0.67    9.62   9.78 9.97 9.44 -0.53   -0.34   -0.19 0.04
36-45 0.82   0.73    9.62   9.80 10.00 9.50 -0.50   -0.29   -0.11 0.07
46-60 0.85   0.73    9.38   9.62 9.87 9.33 -0.54   -0.29   -0.05 0.05
over 60 0.92   0.86    8.92   9.03 9.11 8.88 -0.23   -0.15   -0.04 0.03
Any age 0.60   0.56    9.42   9.57 9.72 9.22 -0.50   -0.35   -0.21 0.34
White Men 18-25 0.67   0.51    10.23   10.51 10.82 10.21 -0.60   -0.30   -0.02 0.01
26-30 0.96   0.87    11.07   11.16 11.27 11.05 -0.23   -0.12   -0.02 0.01
31-35 0.99   0.83    11.26   11.47 11.66 11.26 -0.40   -0.21   0.00 0.01
36-45 0.98   0.84    11.34   11.54 11.74 11.37 -0.37   -0.17   0.03 0.02
46-60 0.97   0.82    11.10   11.33 11.59 11.23 -0.36   -0.10   0.13 0.02
over 60 0.94   0.87    10.32   10.47 10.61 10.54 -0.07   0.07   0.21 0.01
Any age 0.92   0.79    10.92   11.14 11.39 11.02 -0.37   -0.12   0.10 0.08
Coloured 18-25 0.54   0.43    9.31   9.61 9.92 9.26 -0.66   -0.35   -0.05 0.02
and Indian 26-30 0.82   0.74    9.82   9.97 10.14 9.85 -0.29   -0.12   0.03 0.01
Men 31-35 0.84   0.82    10.07   10.12 10.18 10.18 0.01   0.06   0.11 0.01
36-45 0.90   0.82    10.00   10.17 10.33 10.08 -0.25   -0.09   0.08 0.01
46-60 0.91   0.82    9.75   9.96 10.13 9.82 -0.31   -0.14   0.07 0.01
over 60 0.91   0.90    9.21   9.26 9.28 9.17 -0.12   -0.10   -0.04 0.00
Any age 0.79   0.72    9.75   9.91 10.06 9.80 -0.27   -0.12   0.05 0.06
Black 18-25 0.14   0.20      8.85 7.73 8.24 8.79 -1.12   -0.61   -0.05 0.10
Women 26-30 0.38   0.43      9.29 8.50 8.75 9.03 -0.80   -0.54   -0.27 0.05
31-35 0.49   0.56      9.39 8.65 8.93 9.20 -0.75   -0.46   -0.19 0.05
36-45 0.56   0.63      9.32 8.74 9.01 9.27 -0.58   -0.31   -0.05 0.07
46-60 0.60   0.65      9.09 8.58 8.77 8.97 -0.51   -0.32   -0.13 0.06
over 60 0.85   0.92      8.91 8.76 8.83 8.88 -0.15   -0.08   -0.03 0.04
Any age 0.45   0.51      9.15 8.54 8.80 9.06 -0.61   -0.35   -0.09 0.38
White 18-25 0.55   0.51    10.25   10.32 10.46 10.00 -0.46   -0.32   -0.24 0.01
Women 26-30 0.69   0.67    10.64   10.68 10.74 10.64 -0.11   -0.05   0.00 0.01
31-35 0.68   0.66    10.59   10.64 10.69 10.68 -0.02   0.04   0.09 0.01
36-45 0.64   0.66      10.67 10.76 10.80 10.88 0.08   0.13   0.21 0.02
46-60 0.59   0.63      10.47 10.36 10.48 10.67 -0.11   0.01   0.19 0.02
over  60 0.70     0.66    9.60  9.73 9.83 9.73 -0.10  0.01  0.13 0.02
Any age 0.64   0.63    10.36   10.38 10.39 10.40 0.01   0.03   0.04 0.08
Coloured 18-25 0.43   0.39    9.40   9.54 9.72 9.00 -0.71   -0.53   -0.39 0.02
and Indian 26-30 0.57   0.61      9.70 9.37 9.52 9.71 -0.33   -0.18   0.01 0.01
Women 31-35 0.65     0.62    9.59  9.67 9.77 9.68 -0.09  0.01  0.10 0.01
36-45 0.58   0.61      9.63 9.43 9.54 9.71 -0.20   -0.08   0.08 0.01
46-60 0.52   0.57      9.27 9.06 9.24 9.44 -0.21   -0.03   0.17 0.01
over 60 0.79   0.91      8.95 8.77 8.91 8.95 -0.18   -0.03   0.01 0.01
Any age 0.56   0.58      9.48 9.23 9.32 9.45 -0.25   -0.16   -0.03 0.06
Note: Each entry in the table gives a statistic for a specific cell defined by age, sex, and race.  The first two columns of the
table define the cell represented in the given row. For additional details, see stub to Table 7.